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INTRODUCTION
A court order terminating a person’s parental rights—
permanently and completely severing their legal relationship with
their child—is one of the most extreme measures that the state can take
against an individual. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg noted:
“[T]ermination adjudications involve the awesome authority of the
State ‘to destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental
relationship,’”1 rendering former parents as “legal nonentities.”2
Justice John Paul Stevens observed that, while incarceration is a “pure
deprivation of liberty,” terminating parental rights is a “deprivation of
both liberty and property, because statutory rights of inheritance as
well as the natural relationship may be destroyed.” 3 He added:
“Although both deprivations are serious, often the deprivation of
parental rights will be the more grievous of the two.” 4

1. M.L.B. v S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996).
2. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS:
THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 155 (1994).
3. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
4. Id.
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Most people associate such a drastic outcome with public child
welfare proceedings, where a state or county child protective services
(CPS) agency has removed a child from their home after an
investigation into abuse or neglect. In fact, state laws across the
country permit private individuals to petition a court to terminate
another person’s parental rights for many stated reasons.5 For
example, a court can terminate a parent’s rights to allow a child’s
adoption to proceed without that parent’s consent.6 Many jurisdictions
also permit a parent or other individual to initiate a termination of
parental rights (“TPR” or “termination”) action based on allegations
of abandonment or serious misconduct. 7 While private termination
actions are not uncommon, there has been scant scholarly examination
of these matters, their underlying purposes, or their role in
contemporary family law.8 This Article aims to fill that gap.
Private termination actions are drastic in that they implicate
“parental rights” not with reference to limits on the exercise of any
specific rights, such as the selection of a child’s religion or education
but, rather, with reference to the existence of a legally recognized
parent-child relationship.9 After termination, the former parent has no
standing to seek involvement in a child’s life in the future. 10 A
termination order results in complete deprivation of a fundamental
constitutional liberty interest with profound and lasting legal—and
potentially, in many cases, emotional—consequences for both the
former parent and the child. 11
I use the term “private” in the Article to refer to TPR court actions
initiated by an individual as distinct from a dependency or child
protection action initiated by a public CPS agency. 12 While any court
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 110-125 and accompanying text.
8. See Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Concerns at the Margins of Supervised Access
to Children, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 201, 223 n.98 (2007) (“Very little discussion of
private termination of parental rights has occurred in the literature. Most
termination of parental rights cases arise in the context of public agency
interventions in families.”).
9. See infra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
10. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749, 759 (1982).
11. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59 (1981).
12. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & VIVEK S. SANKARAN, REPRESENTING
PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES: ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FOR FAMILY
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order severing a parent’s legal relationship is a form of state action,
the Article is particularly concerned with contexts in which the public
family regulation system, as the party seeking and obtaining TPR
under the state’s parens patriae authority, has no formal role. Private
termination actions are brought by individuals to obtain a private
remedy, not to serve the public interest. In general, and with relevant
and sufficient rationales, providing private remedies is an appropriate
core function of law. In the case of private termination proceedings,
however, there is little acknowledgment of the most common
rationales at play and virtually no examination of the relevance or
sufficiency of such rationales.
In most contexts, a private termination serves primarily the
petitioners’ interests while undermining the rights of the terminated
parent and too often disregarding the interests of the child.
Collectively, private termination actions contribute to our
contemporary legal system’s too-hasty inclination to separate families
and to sever legal ties between a parent and their child permanently.
The availability of termination as a private remedy also extends and
reifies the realms in which substance use disorders, incarceration,
poverty, disability, and mental illness are stigmatized. In this way,
private termination actions disproportionately target parents from
vulnerable and marginalized communities, especially parents who are
low-income.13
This Article begins by defining the legal concept of “parental
rights” and commenting on its history and the development of various
routes to terminate such rights. Terminations are the result either of
actions initiated by public CPS agencies or of petitions by private
individuals such as another parent, a relative, or a legal guardian of the
DEFENDERS xix (2015) (noting that proceedings brought by a CPS agency “are
variously known as ‘dependency,’ ‘child neglect,’ ‘child abuse,’ or ‘child
protection,’ depending on the locality.”). Several commentators have adopted the
term “family regulation” to refer to the full system of agencies and interventions, of
which dependency proceedings are one part. See, e.g., Ava Cilia, The Family
Regulation System: Why Those Committed to Racial Justice Must Interrogate It,
HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://harvardcrcl.org/the-family-regulation-system-why-those-committed-toracial-justice-must-interrogate-it/; Cynthia Godsoe, An Abolitionist Horizon for
Child Welfare, LPE PROJECT BLOG (Aug. 6, 2020), https://lpeproject.org/blog/anabolitionist-horizon-for-child-welfare/; Dorothy Roberts, Abolishing Policing also
Means Abolishing Family Regulation, THE IMPRINT (June 16, 2020),
https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/abolishing-policing-also-meansabolishing-family-regulation/44480.
13. See Roberts, supra note 12.
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child.14 I examine the current state of private termination law,
including the contexts in which private petitions are permitted and the
standards that courts apply in these actions. I then review the
implications of permitting this substantial interference with a
fundamental constitutional liberty interest without the accompanying
procedural protections that are afforded to parents in most proceedings
initiated by public CPS agencies.
In the major portion of the Article, I analyze and critique three
rationales—either stated or implied—for private termination actions:
to enable a new parent to be added through adoption; to sever the legal
connection between a child’s parents in order to protect one of the
parents; and to foreclose the possibility of a person’s future exercise
of parental rights. In each case, I test the assumption that such an
extreme remedy is necessary to serve the stated or implied purpose.
As I demonstrate, while the rationales for a TPR may be appropriate
in theory, the purposes it is claimed to serve can, in many contexts, be
served equally well through another route short of termination. I
review several such alternatives, including non-exclusive adoption, de
facto or equitable parentage, and minor guardianship, and highlight
innovative approaches that have been taken by some states.
A common stated purpose for private termination, for example, is
to permit a child’s adoption by the other parent’s new spouse or
partner.15 Such purpose assumes that a child can only have two parents
at any time and that the noncustodial parent’s rights must be
terminated in order that parental rights be granted to the stepparent,
itself a potentially appropriate legal outcome. As I point out, however,
contemporary approaches to parentage have increasingly eroded the
traditional heteronormative conjugal “dyad” model of parentage. 16
Some states’ courts can now establish or recognize parentage for more
than two people in a child’s life. By contrast, in the context of a child’s
conception resulting from sexual assault, where the purpose is to

14. See infra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 279-333 and accompanying text.
16. See Sacha M. Coupet, “Ain’t I A Parent?”: The Exclusion of Kinship
Caregivers from the Debate Over Expansions of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 595, 618–23 (2010). See infra notes 322322–329 and accompanying
text.
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prevent further victimization of the assaulted parent, a termination
order may be the only route to secure such outcome. 17
I conclude the Article by encouraging courts, attorneys, and
policymakers to scrutinize private termination laws and proceedings
and, in specific cases, to consider whether the stated purpose of a
private termination could be served through a less drastic remedy. The
analysis presented in this Article indicates that private terminations
should be reserved for those cases where the child was conceived by
sexual assault or the petitioner demonstrates through clear and
convincing evidence that termination will either provide an
identifiable affirmative benefit for the child that cannot be achieved
otherwise or prevent serious harm to the child that cannot be avoided
through a less “grievous” measure. States should amend their family
law statutes to ensure that these alternative measures are available and
that needed services and supports for families are provided so that,
wherever possible, children can safely remain connected with their
parents. Finally, courts must ensure that rigorous procedural
protections—at least equivalent to those in dependency proceedings—
are extended to persons who are the subject of private petitions to
terminate their parental rights.
I. DEFINING “PRIVATE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS”
The establishment and termination of the parent-child
relationship are aspects of family law, which is largely a creature of
state statutory law.18 While there is a patchwork of terms and standards
employed by states in certain family law topics, there are also trends
and common approaches.19 This Article describes both the broad
commonalities and the different ways that states’ laws address the
question of when, if ever, a private individual can petition a court to
terminate another person’s parental rights. In this first Part, I briefly
examine the origins and contemporary significance of each of the three
key components of “private termination of parental rights.”

17. See infra notes 367–378 and accompanying text.
18. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 766 (2013) (noting that subject
to constitutional guarantees, “‘regulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an area that has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.’” (quoting Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)).
19. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Changing American State and Federal
Childcare Laws: Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 9, 13
(2017).
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A. Defining “Parental Rights”
The term “parental rights” can be used to describe two distinct
legal conceptualizations: a person’s status or a person’s authority over
their children.20 This Article is concerned with parental rights under
the first conceptualization: that is, rights bearing on a person’s legal
relationship to another person (specifically, a child) or, in other words,
that person’s “parentage.” 21 Through such use, the term “parental
rights” demarcates the extent of a parent’s authority regarding that
other person among a defined group of individuals. That is, who,
among a child’s “parents” or parent-like figures, can exercise control
over the child, including having custody of and making decisions
regarding them.22 Defining and terminating parentage also bears on
questions of inheritance and legitimacy to determine who can or
cannot inherit property by operation of state law on the basis of a
familial connection.23
Whatever other family relationships may be recognized by the
individuals concerned, legal relationships among individuals within a
family are wholly creations of the state. 24 As Professor Clare
Huntington notes: “Without the state, there is no family, legally
speaking.”25 People are not “family until the state calls it as such,” and
the state controls the “entry and exit from the legal status of family.”26
20. See Samantha Godwin, Against Parental Rights, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 3–5 (2015) (describing “parental rights” as “the special legal powers of
parents to control major aspects of their children’s lives”). Constitutional principles
identify the extent to which the state may interfere with a person’s authority with
respect to their child with respect to specific decisions, such as whether to vaccinate
and how to educate a child. Id.; see MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 37–38 (Harvard Univ. Press 2005).
21. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(16) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (defining
“parentage” as “the legal relationship between a child and a parent of the child.”).
22. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 20, at 49; Tali Marcus, Cutting Off the
Umbilical Cord—Reflections on the Possibility to Sever the Parental Bond, 25 J. L.
& POL’Y 583, 584–88 (2017).
23. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 203, comment (2017) (noting that the provision
“Unless parental rights are terminated, a parent-child relationship established under
this [act] applies for all purposes, except as otherwise provided by law of this state
other than this [act],” can refer to statutes that preclude inheritance by intestate
succession after termination of parental rights).
24. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 59 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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This control extends to the legal status of a marriage and of the parentchild relationship.27 Although the word “parent” is used in common
parlance to describe a genetic relative, state law—not biology—
determines a person’s legal status as a “parent.” 28
The Uniform Laws Commission’s 2017 Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA) reflects the many routes through which “parentage” can be
established under state law, including genetics, but, also, presumed
parentage, acknowledged or intended parentage, use of reproductive
technology, adoption, and de facto parenthood.29 A wide range of
outcomes turn on the identification of who a child’s legal parents are
and on whether a person is determined to be a “parent” versus a “nonparent.”30 Most significantly, a parentage determination confers the
legal authority to exercise and enforce the specific powers and to take
on the specific responsibilities that accompany the status of “parent.” 31
Today we often emphasize the affectional and psychological
aspects of parenting roles, which can translate into the degree of
contact and influence a person has in a child’s life. In its origins,
however, the legal status of “parent” has little to do with family
intimacy. Rather, it concerns the need to clarify one person’s
relationship to another in the contexts of inheritance, property, or
labor.32 The definition of “parentage” in Black’s Law Dictionary
reflects its enduring association with genetic lineage: “The quality,

27. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 745–46 (2013) (noting that the
“‘regulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an area that has long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the States’”) (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
404 (1975)).
28. See Douglas NeJaime, Who is a Parent?, 43 FAM. ADVOC. 6, 6–7 (2021).
29. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 606–612 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); see
generally Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127
YALE L. J. F. 589 (2018) (addressing the revisions made to the Uniform Parentage
Act and how these revisions address many of the critical gaps in parentage law). See
also Carbone & Cahn, supra note 19, at 14–15 (noting that the determination of legal
parentage under contemporary state laws stems from a foundation of biology,
function, and “formalities”).
30. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 20, at 20 (“[A] myriad of legally significant
consequences follow from the formal recognition of parenthood.”). Third parties,
such as guardians or grandparents, may be able to obtain certain limited rights and
powers with respect to a child, but they retain their “non-parent” status at all times.
31. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 19, at 14 (“Legal parents are those adults
upon whom the law confers recognition, imposes financial obligations, and grants
standing to seek visitation and custody.”).
32. See Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and
Fathers, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 647–49 (2014).
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state, or condition of being a parent; kindred in the direct ascending
line.33
The contemporary legal conceptualization of “parental rights” is
likely related to the evolution of what some have noted as the “rise of
the individual” as having a distinct legal status and the corresponding
decline of the “family” as having such status. 34 This trend over the last
hundred years or so is marked by the recognition—through a series of
landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases—of a fundamental liberty interest
in an individual’s exercise of their role as a parent.35 Court opinions in
the first half of the twentieth century confirmed that the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution protects that interest when there is
unwanted state intrusion in the family, for example, in enforcing child
labor laws.36 With recognition of this constitutional protection,
obtaining and retaining the legal status of parent takes on greater
import.37 As Professor Dana Purvis has observed: “Once the status of
legal parent is recognized, it is a profoundly powerful position.” 38
To some extent, family law has also increasingly recognized
children as individuals who may themselves have “legal rights as
against their own mothers and fathers.” 39 The state is limited in its
ability to enforce a child’s “rights,” however, because, as Professor
Lawrence Friedman observes: “Law and society clearly recognize that
in general the rights of parents are sacred . . . Parental rights are
constitutionally protected.”40 Some commentators have noted that
“robust protection of parental rights also advances society’s interests
33. Parentage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
34. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS,
AND THE LAW 1 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
35. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 20, at 18 (“The subject of parental rights has
been profoundly shaped by the Constitution of the United States, even though neither
the word ‘parent’ nor ‘child’ appears anywhere in it.”).
36. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (finding no
violation of parents’ liberty interest in enforcing child labor laws regarding children
of Jehovah’s Witnesses); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)
(holding that compulsory public school attendance was a violation of parents’ liberty
interest); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 402–03 (1923) (holding that law
prohibiting teaching children foreign language was a violation of parents liberty
interest). See also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 20, at 25–27.
37. See Purvis, supra note 32, at 680.
38. Id. at 649.
39. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 97. See generally GUGGENHEIM, supra note 20
(arguing that children’s rights can serve as a screen for the interests of adults).
40. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 97.
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. . . [by] ensuring that parents discharge their obligations
adequately.”41 Nonetheless, as discussed herein, many jurists are
hesitant to make parents’ constitutionally protected interests the
predominant consideration in either public dependency proceedings or
intra-family disputes, and those interests are too frequently
subordinated to the questionably determined consideration of a child’s
“best interest.”
B. Defining “Termination of Parental Rights”
“Termination of parental rights” refers, in this Article, to the
permanent severing of the legal relationship between a parent and
child: that is, to the undoing of legal parentage, for all purposes,
throughout the life of both. The parent forever loses their legal status
as a parent to that child and all the privileges and rights that flow
therefrom.42 These rights and privileges include the standing to
petition the court to have access to the former child or to exercise some
role in their life.43 It means losing not only the prospect of contact
rights, but, also, the status to make or participate in decisions about the

41. Clare Huntington & Elizabeth S. Scott, Conceptualizing Legal Childhood in
the Twenty-First Century, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1371, 1417 (2020).
42. Some states permit former parents (or the state CPS agency) to petition a court to
reinstate the parent’s rights after termination. But such laws, where they exist, strictly limit
the circumstances under which this can occur, and generally only when the termination
occurred in a dependency case and the child was never adopted. Thus, it is not likely to be
a remedy in the contexts in which a parent’s rights are terminated as the result of private
action. Where reinstatement is not permitted, some former parents seek to adopt their own
former children. See generally Lashanda Taylor Adams, Backward Progress Toward
Reinstating Parental Rights, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 507 (2017) (examining
how bias against parents whose rights have been terminated is reflected in reinstatement
statutes); Child Welfare Info. Gateway, Reinstatement of Parental Rights,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/permanency/reunification/parental-rights/
(last
visited Mar. 26, 2022).
43. The Idaho termination statute includes as a ground that the termination
would serve the best interest of the child and the parents. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 162005 (West 2021). However, an Idaho appeals court has held that a court need not
find that a termination is in the best interest of a parent in every case. Hofmeister v.
Bauer, 719 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986). The court reasoned: “The notion
that involuntary termination benefits the parent causes us some disquietude.
Parenthood confers long-term benefits of comfort and support that ordinarily
outweigh the immediate demands of childrearing. Even a parent of limited capability
may be aggrieved by the loss of these potential benefits. We cannot indulge in a
facile assumption that a mother who neglects her children is better off without them.”
Id. (emphasis added).
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child’s upbringing, including their education, religion, and medical
care.44
A termination order can also mean that a child no longer has the
protections and benefits that accompany a legal tie to the former
parent, including, in most cases, ongoing child support.45 Where a
parent-child legal relationship exists, it continues into adulthood in
terms of inheritance,46 priority for appointment of an adult guardian or
conservator, hospital visitation, and countless other contexts where
such next-of-kin legal relationship confers access and authority. 47
By extension, these legal consequences from termination may
also have a direct impact on the child’s identity and relational rights.
Research of the public child protection system has demonstrated the
negative psychological effects on children from losing a parent, even
one with whom they had only sporadic contact or who was neglectful

44. See Marcus, supra note 22, at 583–84.
45. See, e.g., State Dep’t of Hum. Servs. ex rel. Overstreet v. Overstreet, 78 P.3d
951,
955
(Okla.
2003)
(holding
that
“termination of parental rights also terminates parental duties” consistent with the
approach of a majority of states); Beasnett v. Arledge, 934 So. 2d 345, 348 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that “it is an inherent aspect of
voluntary termination of parental rights that, just as the entire parent-child
relationship terminates, so too does the responsibility to pay child support”); but see
Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117, 1120 (Ala. 2009) (holding that “a parent’s
obligation to pay child support is not extinguished under the CPA when the parent’s
parental rights are terminated”). Cf. Monmouth Cnty. Div. of Soc. Servs. for D.M.
v G.D.M., 705 A.2d 408, 410, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (holding that a
private agreement between two parent to terminate the rights of one was void on the
basis of public policy, in part of because of a parent’s duty of child support). A
termination order usually does not terminate a child support debt accrued prior to
the termination, and some statutes preserve a terminated parent’s ongoing obligation
to pay child support, such as where the child was conceived from a sexual assault.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-121(d) (West 2021).
46. Some statutes specifically preserve a child’s right to inherit from a parent
whose rights were terminated. See, e.g., § 9-10-121(d); Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F.,
365 P.3d 353, 357 (Ariz. 2016). See Richard Lewis Brown, Undeserving Heirs?—
The Case of the “Terminated” Parent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 547, 549 (2006).
47. See Marcus, supra note 22, at 588–604 (discussing symbolic and legal
implications of the fact that “[p]arenthood is conceived [of] as a status for life and
beyond”). For example, under many states’ laws, a parent would be in line of priority
for the appointment as the guardian or conservator of an adult child. See Nina A.
Kohn, Matched Preferences and Values: A New Approach to Selecting Legal
Surrogates, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 399, 405–06 (2015).
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in some way.48 Further, unless a court order or statute provides
otherwise, an order terminating a parent’s relationship to a child also
severs the child’s legal relationship with all other relatives of the
terminated parent, including their grandparents, aunt and uncles, and
even their siblings.49 In some instances, the child may continue to have
contact with the former relatives—either informally or through an
“open adoption” arrangement—but that is not always the case, and
there are usually limitations on the enforceability of such
arrangements.50
The termination of a parent’s rights differs from the appointment
of a legal guardian for their child, the child’s placement in foster care,
or an award of exclusive parental rights and responsibilities regarding
the child to another parent. All of these allow an estranged or
noncustodial parent to seek relief from the courts, based on changed
circumstances, to increase their rights and access to the child. 51 By
contrast, as Justice Blackmun wrote in Santosky v. Kramer:
“Termination denies the natural parents physical custody, as well as
the rights ever to visit, communicate with, or regain custody of the
child . . . [T]erminating parental rights is final and irrevocable. Few
forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.” 52 The
Supreme Court of Ohio recently referred to termination of parental
rights as “the family law equivalent of the death penalty.” 53
Although there are several routes—some quite simple and others
requiring more effort—to establishing legal parentage, termination

48. See GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 12, at 311–14; Pamela LauferUkeles, The Relational Rights of Children, 48 CONN. L. REV. 741, 762–68 (2016);
Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 461–74
(1983).
49. See M.L.B. v S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 121 (1996) (“In contrast to loss of
custody, which does not sever the parent-child bond, parental status termination is
‘irretrievably destructive’ of the most fundamental family relationship.”) (citing
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)). See also GUGGENHEIM, supra note
20, at 37 (discussing how “parental rights doctrine” should be seen more broadly to
include the protection of children’s relationships with their parents and family).
50. See JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, Overview of Legal Status of Post-Adoption
Contact Agreements, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 159–62 (Naomi
R. Cahn & Joan H. Hollinger eds., 2004); HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 85–86,
130.
51. See Garrison, supra note 48, at 445; LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 17:01 (1994) (“In all states custody awards are
modifiable to protect and further the best interests of a child.”).
52. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749, 759 (1982).
53. In re Adoption of Y.E.F., 171 N.E.3d. 302, 310 (Ohio 2020).
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can only occur through a court’s order pursuant to state law.54 As
Professor Huntington notes: “Just as the state decides when a parentchild relationship begins, it also decides when it ends . . . In this way,
the state can end a parent-child relationship, both with the parent’s
permission and without it.”55 As a result of the constitutional
dimensions of one’s status as a parent, once parentage is attained, it
cannot be easily removed, at least in theory. Huntington explains:
“[T]he law places legal parents in the most privileged position vis-avis children, and many of these rights are rooted in the Constitution
and thus highly protected. The most fundamental protection is that
children cannot be taken away from a legal parent without showing
that the parent is unfit.”56
Historically, the legal mechanisms to terminate parentage have
the same original purpose as the mechanisms for its establishment: the
clarification of legal relationships between individuals. While there is
nothing new about children being raised by people other than their
genetic parents, until recent decades there was little need or drive to
sever the legal ties with the child’s original parents to enable such
arrangements.57 Today, although parental rights are still recognized as
constitutionally protected interests, termination of those rights in a
range of contexts is remarkably common, especially for families of
color through the public family regulation system. 58
C. Distinguishing “Public” Versus “Private” Termination of

54. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 n.8 (“[N]o power other than the State can” issue
an “official decree extinguishing . . . parent-child relationships”); In re A.J.S., 492
S.W.3d 674, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he power of the State to terminate the
parental rights of a parent are strictly construed and derive solely from the statute.
There is no common law right of a parent to just terminate the parental rights of the
other parent.”).
55. HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 59.
56. Id. at 61.
57. See MASON, supra note 2, at 109; FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 101.
58. See DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE 150–51 (2002); Christopher Wildeman et al., The Cumulative Prevalence
of Termination of Parental Rights for U.S. Children, 2000–2016, 25 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 32, 39–40 (2020); Christina White, Federally Mandated
Destruction of the Black Family: The Adoption and Safe Families Act, 1 NW. J. L. &
SOC. POL’Y 303, 313–27 (2006).

SMITH MACRO DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

Termination of Parental Rights as a Private Remedy 1186

Parental Rights
As noted earlier, private termination actions are initiated by an
individual rather than a public CPS agency in a dependency action. 59
The proceeding is “private” in the same sense as an express or implied
“private right of action” in the context of enforcing one’s civil rights.60
While the court’s decision to sever the parent’s legal relationship is a
form of state action, 61 the petitioning party seeking and obtaining the
termination of parental rights is not the state family regulation
system.62 More significantly, in TPR proceedings, one or more
individuals is seeking termination as a private remedy of some kind,
that is, to obtain a benefit to that petitioner, rather than to serve a broad
public interest, even if the applicable legal standard refers to “the best
interest of the child.”63
When a child’s situation comes to the attention of a CPS agency,
public employees, usually social workers, will investigate the
concerns or allegations. 64 If they find indications of abuse or neglect,
59. I will refer to all child protection services (CPS) agencies as “the state” in
this context.
60. See, e.g., Caroline Bermeo Newcombe, Implied Private Rights of Action:
Definition, and Factors to Determine Whether a Private Action Will Be Implied from
a Federal Statute, 49 LOY. UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 117, 120 (2017) (“A private right of
action allows a private plaintiff to bring an action based directly on a public statute,
the Constitution, or federal common law.”).
61. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Y.E.F., 171 N.E.3d 302, 311 (Ohio 2020); In re
Adoption of J.E.V., 141 A.3d 254, 261 (N.J. 2016).
62. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (discussing express
and implied rights of action for disability discrimination claims). Permitting private
citizens to sue an individual in order to obtain a court order depriving another person
of their constitutional rights in a context normally reserved for the state, such as
TPR, is somewhat analogous to the statutory scheme enacted by Texas in “Senate
Bill 8,” the anti-abortion law at the center of the pending U.S. Supreme Court
litigation in U.S. v. Texas (Docket No. 21-588) and Whole Women’s Health v.
Jackson (Docket No. 21-463). That law enables private citizens to bring civil actions
against and recover damages from abortion providers and others who are found to
violate the state’s ban on abortions after six weeks of pregnancy. This approach is
seen by some commentators as a troubling new variation on private enforcement
actions. See Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Manifold Threats of the Texas Abortion Law,
THE NEW YORKER (Sept 5, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ourcolumnists/the-manifold-threats-of-the-texas-abortion-law. Private TPR actions
differ in that the target of the claim is the individual whose rights would be
compromised, whereas actions brought under SB8 are not filed against individuals
seeking abortions.
63. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1516.5 (West 2021); see also infra notes 259–
272 and accompanying text.
64. See Josh Gupta-Kagan, America’s Hidden Foster Care System, 72 STAN. L.
REV. 841, 843 (2020).
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or a significant risk of the same, the agency may take any of a wide
range of actions based on an assessment of the situation.65 At the least
severe end of the spectrum, they may refer the family to social services
or develop a safety plan to address a specifically identified problem. 66
At the other end, the agency may initiate a dependency proceeding in
state court and, if warranted, seek a court order to remove the child
from the parents’ home and place the child in foster care or another
form of state custody.67
The aim of state public dependency proceedings—as set by
federal child welfare laws—is to arrive at some kind of a
“permanency” outcome that ends the child’s dependence on the state
and the court sooner rather than later. 68 Under federally-guided policy
principles, the preferred outcome is the child’s reunification with the
parent.69 Accordingly, a CPS agency is required to use “reasonable
efforts to restore children to the family after removal,” including the
provision of supports and services targeted to the family’s needs. 70
Under federal policy, where reunification cannot be achieved
after removal of the child from the family, the next ideal permanency
outcome is adoption,71 which requires severing the child’s legal
65. See id.
66. See id. 848–54.
67. See Elizabeth Fassler & Wanjiro Gethaiga, Representing Parents During
Child Welfare Investigations: Precourt Advocacy Strategies, 30 ABA CHILD. L.
PRAC. 17, 24 (2011); NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, The Child Welfare
Placement Continuum: What’s Best for Children? (Nov. 3, 2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/the-child-welfare-placementcontinuum-what-s-best-for-children.aspx.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2018); Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, It’s A Hard
Knock Life: Does the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 Adequately Address
Problems in the Child Welfare System? 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375, 380 (2002).
Federal mandates enacted through the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act require
that a permanency plan is put in place before the child has been in state custody for
fifteen out of the previous twenty-two months, with a few exceptions.
69. GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 12, at xxii (“[T]he state’s purpose
in virtually all [child protection] cases is to help families find ways to be able to raise
their children safely.”).
70. MASON, supra note 2, at 155.
71. See Garrison, supra note 48, at 442–46. The Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997 imposes requirements that promote adoption, not reunification, as a
permanency outcome, which can undermine the efficacy of reunification efforts in
many instances. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise
and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637,
643–73 (1999).
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relationship with their existing parents. 72 Because such severing
would deprive each parent of a constitutionally protected interest, if
one of the parents does not consent to the adoption, the state must
bring a TPR petition.73 In these instances, the state, acting pursuant to
its parens patriae authority, asks the court to terminate one or more
person’s parental rights in the name of child welfare, “freeing” the
child for adoption.74 Importantly, the court may grant the petition only
if the state has proven parental unfitness, usually by clear and
convincing evidence.75
In the “private” TPR context, by contrast, there is no formal role
for a state agency in the proceeding even though there may have been
a CPS investigation or involvement in the family in the recent past. 76
In some states, the court may order a public CPS agency to do an
assessment or play some other limited role, 77 but the agency is not the
driving force behind the TPR petition. Rather, the petition is filed by
one or more private individuals. Most commonly, the petitioner is the
child’s other parent, either acting alone to seek exclusive parental
rights over the child or acting jointly with the parent’s new partner
who wishes to adopt the child. 78 Alternatively, such a private petition
may be brought by a child’s legal guardian or another person in the
context of a contested adoption. 79
Clearly, these privately initiated proceedings involve a set of
competing interests differing from those in the public dependency
context. Here, the case is a fight between or among individual adults
seeking their own status and authority with respect to a child, rather
72. See infra notes 259–428 and accompanying text.
73. GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 12, at 305–06.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 293–96, 307–08. There need not be an identified adoptive family
in order to grant a petition for TPR. In some instances, a child will continue to be a
state “ward” for some period of time after the TPR, potentially the remainder of their
minority. Garrison, supra note 48, at 475–76.
76. See, e.g., Darla D. v. Grace R., 382 P.3d 1000, 1004 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016);
In the Interest of L.F., No. 02-19-00421-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3879, at 2–3
(Tex. Ct. App. May 7, 2020); Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773, 777–78 (Or. 2000);
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 64, at 852–60 (discussing the “hidden foster care system”
through which a family changes a child’s residence as a result of a CPS agency’s
threat of more formal intervention in the family).
77. See, e.g., E.K. v. TA., 572 S.W.3d 80, 84 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).
78. See, e.g., In re Adoption of K.L.P., 735 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000).
79. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Robert S., No. F060073, 2011 WL 2152626,
at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 2, 2011).
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than the state acting against an individual pursuant to its parens
patriae authority to protect children. 80 In private termination
proceedings, the court’s role is akin to that in contested child custody
cases, including third-party proceedings: awarding relief to
individuals while ensuring that the result is in the child’s best interest.
In private TPR litigation, the absence of the state and of the
constituent obligations that accompany its presence can have a
substantial impact on the proceedings and outcome. As discussed in
Part IV below, some courts conclude that unless the TPR litigation can
be considered a form of “state action,” fewer procedural protections,
including the right to appointed counsel,81 need to be afforded the
parents involved.82 Further, petitions brought by individuals are not
required to comply with federal policy goals of family preservation. 83
A person’s parental rights can be severed without any showing of

80. Some states permit a public dependency proceeding to be converted to a
private TPR action by individuals who have been awarded custody of the child. See,
e.g., A.F. v. L.B., 572 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019); In re L.C.R., 739 S.E.2d
596, 597 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). See also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 20, at 48–49
(“One of the most deeply contentions issues in American family law a struggle
among adults over who gets the bundle of rights parents possess . . . Precisely
because of the extraordinary authority over children that the law cedes to parents, it
is exceedingly important to ascertain who gets to be counted as a ‘parent’ under the
law and who, as a result, obtains the bundle of rights that parents enjoy.”).
81. See, e.g., In re G.J.P., 314 S.W.3d 217, 219, 222–24 (Tex. App. 2010)
(father had appointed counsel in a dependency TPR proceeding but lost that right
when the proceeding was converted into a private TPR action brought by
grandparents).
82. See, e.g., In re K.L.P. v. R.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 753 (Ill. 2002) (holding that
a parent’s right to counsel in private TPR matter stemmed from the “significant state
action” from the child’s initial placement with a non-parent by a CPS agency);
A.W.S. v. A.W., 2014 MT 332, ¶ 17–18, 337 Mont. 234, 339 P.3d 414; compare
with In re Adoption of Y.E.F., 171 N.E.3d. 302, 311 (Ohio 2020) (noting that private
TPR is still state action because “only the state has the power to extinguish the
parent-child relationship”). See infra notes 235–256 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2018). The federal Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) requirements, however, apply in all termination proceedings involving
parental rights “to an Indian child.” The broad language of that statute provides:
“[a]ny party seeking to effect . . . termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide
remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the
Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.” Id. See also S.S. v.
Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, 573–74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (applying ICWA in a TPR
case between parents based on allegations of abandonment).
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failed efforts to reunify or repair the relationship between that parent
and their child.84
II. THE CONTEXTS IN WHICH A PARENT’S RIGHTS CAN BE
TERMINATED WITHOUT DIRECT STATE INVOLVEMENT
This Part will provide a brief overview of the contexts in which
the termination of parental rights can happen outside of state-initiated
dependency proceedings. The predominant one is adoption, which can
involve either voluntary or involuntary termination of a parent’s rights
in the context of the proceeding. Some state laws—or courts’
interpretations of the same—allow a parent or other private individual
to file a termination petition outside of the adoption context, usually
under specific circumstances, such as when a child was conceived
from a sexual assault. 85
A. Termination as Part of Adoption Proceedings
The most common context in which a parent’s rights may be
terminated outside of a public dependency proceeding is adoption. A
person can seek to adopt another person in a range of scenarios. There
may be an arrangement made at or before the child’s birth that
someone other than the child’s genetic parents will raise the child.
Alternatively, the spouse or partner of a child’s existing parent may
seek to establish a formal legal relationship with a child for any
number of reasons.86 A child’s guardian or other long-term caregiver
may seek to adopt the child. 87 In all contexts, an adopting parent is
replacing an existing parent. 88
84. See, e.g., A.K.H. v. J.D.C., 619 S.W.3d 425, 431 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021); Darla
D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, ¶ 56, 382 P.3d 1000; In re Caroline, 638 N.Y.S.2d
997, 999–1000 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
85. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.180 (West 2021); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 170-C:5-a (2021); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-3.5-3 (West 2021).
86. 1 THOMAS A. JACOBS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS §
4:50 (2018); Margaret M. Mahoney, Family Boundaries: Symposium on Third-Party
Rights and Obligations with Respect to Children, Stepparents as Third Parties in
Relation to Their Stepchildren, 40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 88–89 (2006).
87. See Guardianship of Ann S., 202 P.3d 1089, 1094–95, 1104, 1106–07 (Cal.
2009); see also In re Adoption of L.E., 2012 ME 127, 5–6, 56 A.3d 1234, 1236.
88. BARBARA ANN ATWOOD, CHILDREN, TRIBES, AND STATES: ADOPTION AND
CUSTODY CONFLICTS OVER AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN 143 (2010); Naomi Cahn,
Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1125 (2003); Alison
Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the
Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 506–07 (1998) (noting that
adoption creates a new family unit while “annihilat[ing] the pre-existing unit”).
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By operation of law, an adoption severs the legal relationship
between any existing parent and the adoptee, unless the existing parent
is an adoption co-petitioner or, under some state laws, married to the
petitioner.89 Adoption “create[s] a new family and destroy[s]—
obliterate[s]—the old one.”90 For this reason, the status of existing
parents and the impact of any adoption on their rights must be
addressed before the adoption is finalized. 91 State laws take a few
different approaches to this inquiry, but they all operate in essentially
similar ways and with similar outcomes. 92
Adoption laws have long recognized that, so long as the parent
retains some residual rights, they have standing to refuse to consent to
the child’s adoption.93 A parent may consent to the adoption of their
child, allowing the adoption to sever their legal relationship with the
adoptee upon the issuance of the adoption decree. 94 Such consent must
be knowing, informed, and intentional because of the constitutional
rights implicated.95 An existing parent may not only consent to another
person’s adoption of their child, but also join the adoption petition,
essentially becoming an adopting parent themselves so that the
severance has no actual effect on their rights. 96 This can occur in an

89. See, e.g., Wright v. Howard, 711 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986)
(“[T]he adoption judgment itself terminates parental rights by virtue of the
provisions of” the adoption statute).
90. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 115. Cf. Rybolt v. Brooks, 884 N.E.2d 931,
937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming denial of grandparents’ petition to adopt child
because of likelihood of continued contact with former parents and noting “It is well
known that one of the purposes of adoption is ‘to assure that the severance of family
ties by adoption be complete so as to protect the ‘new family union which the law
had created.’”) (quoting Handshoe v. Ridgway, 870 N.E.2d 517, 521 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007)).
91. See JENNIFER FAIRFAX, ADOPTION LAW HANDBOOK: PRACTICE,
RESOURCES, AND FORMS FOR FAMILY LAW PROFESSIONALS 138–40 (2011); Joan
Heifetz Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN
ADOPTION READER 37, 38 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan H. Hollinger eds. 2004).
92. See FAIRFAX, supra note 91, at 138.
93. Cahn, supra note 88, at 1118–26 (“The necessity of parental consent to
adoption was a critical component in the early adoption statutes.”).
94. FAIRFAX, supra note 91, at 146. Although a parent may consent to the
termination of their rights through adoption, a parent may not initiate a proceeding
to sever their legal relationship to a child. See Marcus, supra note 22, at 610.
95. See FAIRFAX, supra note 91, at 147.
96. See Mahoney, supra note 86, at 89–90.
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adoption by the existing parent’s spouse or partner, which I will refer
to generally in this Article as “stepparent adoption.” 97
If one of a child’s existing parents does not consent to the
adoption, a court may allow the adoption to proceed only if that
parent’s status is addressed through formal adjudication, based on that
state’s adoption law. 98 States take two different routes to enable an
adoption to proceed in the absence of a parent’s consent. The court
may determine that the parent’s consent is unnecessary or has been
waived by the parent due to their actions or inactions with respect to
the child, most commonly “abandonment” or a failure to support the
child.99 A court’s finding dispensing with the need for the parent’s
consent allows the adoption to be finalized, severing that parent’s
relationship with their child when the adoption decree is issued.100
Alternatively, a state’s law may require an adoption petitioner to
petition the court to terminate the non-consenting parent’s rights as a
predicate to the adoption.101 If the petition to terminate is granted, the
former parent loses any power to consent or object to the adoption
because they no longer have legal status as a “parent.” In this Article,
I will refer to both routes as “termination” because, even if the
adjudication paths differ somewhat, the legal effect is identical. 102
Parental consent to adoption is related to the development of
requirements for a “putative” father to be recognized as the legal father
97. See, e.g., Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, 175 A.3d 639, 646 (Me.
2017); Adoption of I.M., 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 818, 820–21, 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014);
A.J. v. K.A.O., 951 So. 2d 30, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
98. See MASON, supra note 2, at 150; see also JACOBS, supra note 86, at § 4:05.
99. See, e.g., Copeland v. Todd, 715 S.E.2d 11, 16–17 (Va. 2011); Dale
Margolin Cecka, Terminating Parental Rights Through a Backdoor in the Virginia
Code: Adoptions Under Section 63.2-1202(H), 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 371, 371–73
(2013). See infra notes 132–153 and accompanying text.
100. See generally JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2.10 (describing exceptions to the requirement of parental consent); 2 ANN M.
HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE, AND ADOPTION CASES § 14:14
(3d ed. 2009).
101. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.51 (West 2021) (“If the parents
of a child are divorced, or if the parents are unmarried but the father has
acknowledged paternity or is a putative father who meets the conditions in section
39(2) of this chapter, and if a parent having custody of the child according to a court
order subsequently marries and that parent’s spouse petitions to adopt the child, the
court upon notice and hearing may issue an order terminating the rights of the other
parent . . .”). See also HOLLINGER, supra note 100, at § 4.04[1]; see also A.K.H. v.
J.D.C., 619 S.W.3d 425, 431 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021) (noting distinction between
terminating a parent’s rights in a specific proceeding and permitting an adoption to
proceed without a parent’s consent).
102. HOLLINGER, supra note 100, at § 4.04[1][d].

SMITH MACRO DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

1193

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 72:1173

of a child. If a man is precluded from establishing his parental rights,
then his consent to adoption is not needed. 103 In their historical
overview of adoption, Christine A. Adamec and Laurie C. Miller
observe that, before the 1972 U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Stanley
v. Illinois:
[N]o consideration was given to the desires of a birthfather not
married to a child’s birthmother. If the birthmother chose
adoption for “her” child, then the adoption could go forth.
After the Stanley decision and several other subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, states passed a variety of laws
designed to protect the paternal rights of the birthfather.104
As it became easier for a man to claim parental rights as an
unmarried father, however, an expanding number of adoption
petitioners were in the position of needing a route to ask a court to
terminate a father’s rights if he did not consent to the adoption. 105 As
described by Adamec and Miller: “Today, a crazy quilt of laws
nationwide provide for what actions, if any, must be taken” to address
the need for consent by unmarried fathers. 106
The “crazy quilt” characterization applies to all aspects of
termination in the context of adoption, as states have varied
approaches to the proceedings.107 But the objective of any route is the
same: insuring that a parent is unable to block their child’s adoption
by withholding their consent.

103. See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.E.V., 141 A.3d 254, 260 (N.J. 2016); In re
Adoption of Tobias D., 2012 ME 45, ¶ 10, 40 A.3d 990, 993–94.
104. Christine A. Adamec & Laurie C. Miller, Brief History of Adoption, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION, at xxxii (3d ed. 2007).
105. See Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental
Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292, 2334–35 (2016) (discussing the
impact of Stanley on adoption practice).
106. Adamec & Miller, supra note 104, at xxxii.
107. Some laws include termination or dispensing with the need for consent as
procedural step within the adoption proceeding itself. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 366.26(b)(1) (Deering 2021) (“Terminate the rights of the parent or parents
and order that the child be placed for adoption and, upon the filing of a petition for
adoption in the juvenile court, order that a hearing be set. The court shall proceed
with the adoption after the appellate rights of the natural parents have been
exhausted.”), while others set the termination and adoption as separate proceedings.
See, e.g., In re A.A.B., 2016 SD 22, ¶ 4–5, 877 N.W.2d 355, 358.

SMITH MACRO DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

Termination of Parental Rights as a Private Remedy 1194

B. Termination Petitions Filed by One Parent Against Another
A less common context for termination of parental rights outside
of public dependency proceedings is when one parent seeks to obtain
exclusive parental rights to the child by terminating the rights of
another parent from whom they are separated. In these contexts, rather
than replacing an existing parent with a “new” parent through an
accompanying adoption, the termination proceeding only eliminates
the parental status of one of a child’s parents. 108 There is even greater
variation among courts for this kind of termination proceeding than in
adoption contexts, and many states do not permit private termination
of parental rights outside of the adoption context at all. 109
Courts generally construe termination statutes strictly; if there is
no basis to find jurisdiction over a petition for private termination
brought by a parent or other individual, a court will likely reject the
petition.110 For example, in states where a TPR statute refers only to
the state as a potential petitioning party, courts will not allow parents
or any private parties to initiate such proceedings.111 Similarly, if such
a statute includes clear categories of petitioners, including private
parties, but does not include parents among them, a court will construe
such categories as excluding parents and reject a parent’s termination
petition.112
For example, in a 2014 opinion in a termination action brought
by a child’s mother, the Montana Supreme Court held that that state’s
TPR statute allowed termination only in the context of an adoption or
in a proceeding initiated by the state. 113 Similarly, a Louisiana appeals
court noted prior authority interpreting that state’s TPR statute
narrowly to hold: “[T]here is no private right of action to terminate
another parent’s parental rights, and there are no circumstances under

108. However, court opinions reveal that parents often bring these petitions as
a precursor to a stepparent adoption. See, e.g., Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 365 P.3d
353, 354–55 (Ariz. 2016).
109. HARALAMBIE, supra note 100, at § 13:4. See, e.g., In re Termination of
Parental Rights of P.A.M., 505 N.W.2d 395, 397–98 (S.D. 1993).
110. See, e.g., In re John, 605 A.2d 486, 488 (R.I. 1992).
111. See, e.g., In re A.J.S., 492 S.W.3d 674, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Bergsing
v. Cardona, 2014 MT 237, ¶14, 377 Mont. 270, 274, 339 P.3d 824, 827. Cf. D.S. v.
R.S., 717 N.E.2d 557, 560 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (noting that while statute 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405 / 2 (West 1998) appears to permit a private party to file a
termination petition, only the state may “prosecute” it).
112. See, e.g., Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tenn. 2004).
113. See Bergsing, 2014 MT at ¶ 11, 377 Mont. at 273, 339 P.3d at 826.
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which one parent may file a petition to terminate the parental rights of
another parent.”114 The court reasoned:
Because termination of parental rights is recognized as one of
the most drastic actions a state can take against a citizen . . .
[a]bsent a clear indication from the Louisiana Legislature that
one parent may seek to revoke the parental rights of the other
parent . . . we decline to do so. 115
Among those states that do allow one parent to petition to
terminate the rights of another, some specifically include a child’s
parent among the categories of individuals who can bring a
termination petition against a parent.116 For example, Alabama
amended its termination statute in 2009 to expand the list of those who
can file a TPR petition to include not only public CPS or private
adoption agencies but also: “[a] parent, child, or any interested
person.”117 Similarly, in states with statutes that have broad standing
language regarding termination petitions, some state court opinions
interpret the categories of potential TPR petitioners to include parents
or other individuals even if they are not expressly mentioned. 118 A
114. In re T.E.R., 43, 145, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 03/19/08); 979 So. 2d 663, 667.
However, in a later opinion, a Louisiana appeals court recognized that a juvenile
court has the discretion to appoint a private attorney to pursue a TPR action. State
ex rel. C.E.K., 2017-0409, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/21/17); 234 So. 3d 1059, 1065.
115. C.E.K., 2017-0409 at p. 8, 234 So. 3d. at 1065.
116. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1103(a)(1) (West 2021); Thomas R.
Young, Termination of Parental Rights: Who May File a Petition, in N.C. JUVENILE
CODE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3:8 (2021).
117. ALA. CODE § 12-15-317 (2021) (“The Department of Human Resources,
any public or private licensed child-placing agency, parent, child, or any interested
person may file a petition to terminate the parental rights of a parent or parents of a
child.”) (emphasis added). See IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.5(1)(a) (West 2021) (“The
following persons may petition a juvenile court for termination of parental rights
under this chapter if the child of the parent-child relationship is born or expected to
be born within one hundred eighty days of the date of petition filing: a. A parent or
prospective parent of the parent-child relationship.”). Like Alabama’s law, some
other state statutes appear to allow a child to be among the petitioners in a
termination action. There is a dearth of caselaw on such petitions, but some
practitioners have had success at least establishing the standing of children to seek
termination of their parents’ rights. See also HARALAMBIE, supra note 100, at § 13:4;
Priscilla Day, Should Children Be Able to Divorce Their Parents?, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 652, 653 (2000).
118. See, e.g., In re Austin T., 2006 ME 28, ¶ 4, 898 A.2d 946, 948 (holding
that mother qualified as a “custodian of the child” and therefore had standing to bring
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Florida statute provides that “any [] person who has knowledge of the
facts alleged or is informed of them and believes that they are true”
may bring a termination petition. 119
Some states limit termination petitions filed by a parent to
specific circumstances.120 For example, Tennessee amended its TPR
statute to permit one parent to file a termination petition against
another under only three grounds: extreme child sexual abuse;
conviction of rape resulting in the child’s conception; or attempting to
murder the petitioning parent.121 As discussed further in the next part,
many states permit one parent to petition to terminate the rights of
another specifically where the child’s conception resulted from a
sexual assault.122 Other states permit a parent to petition to terminate
the other on the basis of abandonment or a failure to support the

a TPR petition against child’s father); T.P. v T.W., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 477, 483 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011). See also Ex parte Johnson, 474 So. 2d 715, 717 (Ala. 1985)
(“[T]here is no logical reason to allow only the state to file a petition to have parental
rights terminated. Why should a parent, who has direct knowledge and familiarity
with a situation, be required to go to the state to obtain such a result, when it would
be more direct for the parent to file the petition?”).
119. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.802 (West 2021). See also CAL. FAM. CODE §
7841(a) (West 2021) (“An interested person may file a petition under this part for an
order or judgment declaring a child free from the custody and control of either or
both parents.”); T.P., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480–81 (interpreting such language to
confer standing on mother to bring TPR petition against father). This language has
nonetheless been interpreted strictly by Florida courts in “single-parent termination”
cases. See, e.g., In re A.L.R., 918 So. 2d 395, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(vacating TPR order on petition brought a mother against the father based on several
errors including not analyzing all of the statutory factors and also a lack of
assessment of whether the context fit one of the enumerated circumstances under
which “the parental rights of one parent may be severed without severing the
parental rights of the other parent”).
120. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.180 (West 2021); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-35-3.5-3 (West 2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5 (2021).
121. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1–113 (West 2021); see also ALASKA STAT.
ANN. § 25.23.180I(2) (West 2021) (“parent committed an act constituting sexual
assault, sexual abuse of a minor, or incest”).
122. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-3.5-3 (West 2021) (“[I]f a child was
conceived as a result of an act of rape, the parent who is the victim of the act of rape
may file a verified petition with the juvenile or probate court to terminate the parentchild relationship between the child and the alleged perpetrator of the act of rape”).
See generally Judith Lewis, The Stability Paradox: The Two-Parent Paradigm and
the Perpetuation of Violence Against Women in Termination of Parental Rights and
Custody Cases, 27 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 311 (2021) (examining how courts have
interpreted parental rights statutes where a child is conceived as a result of rape).
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child.123 In many respects, these one-parent termination proceedings
are “extreme” custody cases proceedings, in that they resemble
custody disputes between parents in terms of the allegations and
evidence but with far higher stakes.124
III. THE GROUNDS FOR PRIVATE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
This part provides an overview of the statutory grounds on which
a court may base a termination order against a parent in a case initiated
by a private individual. Most state TPR laws require a two-step
determination: first, there must be specific findings demonstrating the
“unfitness” of the parent due to their conduct, condition, or
circumstances;125 second, there must be a specific finding that the
termination of that parent’s rights would be in the best interest of the
child.126 Such findings, as a matter of constitutional law, must be based
on at least clear and convincing evidence. 127 The requirement of
123. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1111(a) (West 2021) (allowing a
parent awarded legal custody of a child to petition to terminate the rights of another
parent who “has for a period of one year or more next preceding the filing of the
petition or motion willfully failed without justification to pay for the care, support,
and education of the juvenile, as required by the decree or custody agreement.”);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.8 (West 2021).
124. See, e.g., In re A.L.R., 918 So. 2d 395, 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(vacating termination order in case filed by one parent against another when trial
court treated proceedings as a custody matter); S.S. v D.L., 944 So. 2d 553, 557 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that TPR cases filed by divorced parents “invit[e]
caution to avoid second challenges to custody determinations”). See generally D.
Marianne Brower Blair, Parent-Initiated Termination of Parental Rights: The
Ultimate Weapon in Matrimonial Warfare, 24 TULSA L. J. 299 (1988) (examining
parent-initiated proceedings to terminate the parental rights of the other parent and
how such proceedings are conducted in Oklahoma).
125. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-105 (West 2021) (listing several
different grounds for TPR in adoption context).
126. See, e.g., In re A.U.D., 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (N.C. 2019) (“Our Juvenile
Code provides for a two-stage process for the termination of parental rights—an
adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage . . . If a trial court finds one or more
grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), it then proceeds
to the dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) states, in pertinent part, as follows:
‘After an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent’s rights
exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the
juvenile’s best interest . . .’”).
127. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768–70 (1982); Hofmeister v.
Bauer, 719 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (applying clear and convincing
evidence standard in private termination context and reasoning, “We see no reason
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finding “unfitness” before consideration of a child’s best interest
reflects not only constitutional requirements 128 but also a policy
determination that termination should be reserved only as a last resort,
when a parent is found unable to function in the role of parent.
Laws concerning these requirements vary greatly across states in
two important respects. First, they specify a wide range of grounds for
a finding under the initial step in the analysis. 129 Second, while some
state laws provide universal termination standards that apply in public
dependency, adoption, and one-parent termination cases, other states
have enacted standards that apply only in specific kinds of
proceedings.130 Where there is a universal standard or something close
to that, a private termination case can be based on the same
problematic grounds developed and applied in the public family
regulation system. These grounds are effectively based on the
stigmatization of substance use, poverty, disability, and incarceration,
all of which have been employed against families of color in
particular.131 As discussed in Parts IV and V below, standards based
on these grounds were developed to serve purposes different from
those commonly seen in private termination cases and to be applied
with different procedures.
A. Abandonment and Non-Support
From the case law, it appears that the most common grounds on
which private termination petitions are based are abandonment, nonsupport, or other conduct that is deemed an abdication of the role as
“parent.” States describe “abandonment” in different ways. 132 For
example, an Alabama law defines abandonment in the termination
context as:

why the parental interest should receive less protection from the risk of fact-finding
error in a ‘private’ termination case than in a ‘public’ case.”). But see Guardianship
of Ann S., 202 P.3d 1089, 1101–03 (Cal. 2009) (holding that a parent’s rights can
be terminated based only on “best interest of the child” grounds without running
afoul of the constitution); In re H.J., 200 A.3d 891, 894 (N.H. 2018) (termination of
parental rights requires findings “beyond a reasonable doubt”).
128. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 n.10.
129. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 100, at § 13:7.
130. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-220 (West 2021) (permitting TPR in
adoption “on any ground provided by other law for termination of the [parent-child]
relationship”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7822 (West 2021).
131. See ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 33–46.
132. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 100, at § 13:10.
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A voluntary and intentional relinquishment of the custody of a
child by a parent, or a withholding from the child, without good
cause or excuse, by the parent, of his or her presence, care,
love, protection, maintenance, or the opportunity for the
display of filial affection, or the failure to claim the rights of a
parent, or failure to perform the duties of a parent.133
Statutes may require evidence of specific conduct (or inaction)
for a court to infer that a person has intentionally foregone the rights
and responsibilities of parenthood. 134 A statute may, for example,
permit a finding of abandonment based on a parent’s lack of contact
or communication with the child. 135 Many statutes include specific
time frames for a failure to have contact with the child without
justifiable cause—some as short as six months—as prima facie
evidence of abandonment. 136 Courts vary in terms of what they
consider to be justifiable cause for the lack of contact, 137 such as
interference by the petitioning parent. 138 In some cases, a parent had
limited rights under an existing court order to visit the child, and such
133. ALA. CODE § 12–15–301(1) (2021).
134. See, e.g., C.C. v. L.J., 176 So. 3d 208, 211 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (“[A]
juvenile court may premise a finding of abandonment only upon evidence indicating
that a parent voluntarily, intentionally, and unjustifiably committed the actions or
omissions set out” in the statutory standard for abandonment); Darla D. v. Grace R.,
2016-NMCA-093, 41, 382 P.3d 1000, 1012 (“Abandonment, in its purest form,
requires a complete renunciation of responsibility.”); In re Adoption of Female
Child, No. 23229, 2003 Haw. App. LEXIS 189, at *7–8 (Haw. Ct. App. June 18,
2003) (noting requirement for “a separate inquiry into the parents’ intent as evinced
by such action or from the totality of circumstance” for a finding of abandonment).
135. See, e.g., David S. v. Jared H., 308 P.3d 862, 868, 873 (Alaska 2013)
(affirming TPR based on father’s failure to “meaningfully communicate” with child
for more than a year) (applying ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.050 (West 2021)).
136. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (West 2021); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN § 8-531(1) (2021).
137. See Ainsworth v. Nat. Father, 414 So. 2d 417, 421 (Miss. 1982) (Lee, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing statutory definition of abandonment because “[t]he phrase,
‘made no contact with a child under the age of three (3) for six (6) months or a child
three (3) years of age or older for a period of one (1) year’ is meaningless because
as many explanations and excuses may be made to the reason for no contact within
such short periods as there are broken homes”).
138. See David S., 308 P.3d at 868–73 (rejecting a number of arguments
advanced by father to support justifiable cause for not communicating with his
daughter for more than a year); see also Margaret Y. v. John Y., No. 1 CA-JV 190051, 2019 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1021, at *5–8 (Ariz. Ct. App., Sept. 17, 2019)
(rejecting mother’s argument that father “alienated” children against her as the basis
for her lack of contact).
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terms may have been sought by the parent now petitioning to terminate
the parent’s rights. 139 How a court can assess a parent’s true intent in
such contexts is questionable. As discussed in Part IV.B, applying the
concept of abandonment in the context of private TPR cases can be
problematic when, unlike many public dependency cases, there is no
predicate requirement of reunification services. 140
A failure to provide financial support to the child can be evidence
of abandonment or a distinct ground on which to terminate a parent’s
rights.141 Many state laws set out a specific period of time for such
non-support as a basis for the finding.142 While some courts require a
complete absence of payments to find non-support, some of these laws
allow termination if a parent has not made all of the child support
payments due under a court order, even if the parent had made some
payments in the recent past. 143 A parent’s ability to pay support is often
considered by courts,144 but the case law reveals little consideration of
whether the parent had access to legal assistance to modify a child

139. See, e.g., Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 304 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2013) (“A parent may not restrict the other parent from interacting with their child
and then petition to terminate the latter’s rights for abandonment.”); see also S.S. v.
Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, 576 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (affirming dismissal of
father’s TPR petition against mother on the basis of abandonment where he obtained
court orders precluding any contact between her and the children).
140. See Margaret Y., 2019 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1021, at *9.
141. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 100, at § 13:10.
142. See id.; see also, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A) (West 2021)
(failure “to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by law
or judicial decree for a period of at least one year” does not require the parent to
consent to the adoption).
143. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-310(a)(3) (2021) (“The parent has
wantonly and willfully failed to comply for a period of 12 months or longer with a
decree to support his or her child that has been entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction of this or any other state.”); In re Adoption of A.C.B., 159 Ohio St. 3d
256, 259, 2020-Ohio-629,150 N.E.3d 82, 85 (“Whether father has provided the
necessary support under the statute [to avoid a finding of non-support] is measured
by the terms of the judicial decree.”).
144. See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.R.H., 823 P.2d 383, 387 (Okla. Civ. App
1991) (vacating TPR order for nonsupport because there was “no evidence in the
record of the natural father’s willful failure to support his son according to his
financial ability”); In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999) (“The federal
and state constitutions require the opportunity for an individualized determination
that a parent is either unfit or will cause substantial harm to his or her child before
the fundamental right to the care and custody of the child can be taken away.”);
HARALAMBIE, supra note 100, at § 13:10.
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support order earlier to accurately reflect their financial
circumstances.145
Some courts are wary of applying these grounds too liberally or
inferring abandonment where a parent has taken steps to place the
child in the care of another person because of the parent’s limited
ability to provide parental care. For example, the Court of Appeals of
Kansas affirmed the denial of termination petition brought by a mother
against the father alleging abandonment.146 The court reasoned that
abandonment means “to cease providing care for the child . . .
combined with a failure to provide substitute care for the child.” 147 In
that case, the father “did not leave [the child] without financial or
emotional support; he left [the child] with Mother.” 148
Use of abandonment and non-support grounds is prevalent in the
adoption-consent context,149 as, under many states’ laws, a court’s
finding that a parent has abandoned a child is an acceptable basis on
which to waive the requirement of their consent to the adoption or to
terminate that parent’s rights. For example, Vermont’s adoption
statute, based on the Model Adoption Act, permits termination of a
non-consenting parent’s rights based on abandonment, and it sets forth
factors that a court must consider, which include non-support and lack
of communication.150 These grounds create a termination
presumption, which may be rebutted by the parent, triggering yet
another list of factors that must be found by clear and convincing
evidence before the parent’s rights may be terminated.151

145. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET
CIVIL
LEGAL
NEEDS
OF
LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS
9
(2017),
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf
(noting that “95% of parents in child support cases were unrepresented in [state]
courts in 2013.”).
146. In re K.G., No. 112115, 2015 WL 3514169, at *12. (Kan. Ct. App. May
22, 2015).
147. Id. at *6.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 87–107 and accompanying text.
150. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504(a)(1)–(2) (2021). The grounds for
TPR include clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the child is under six months of
age and the parent “did not exercise parental responsibility once he or she knew or
should have known of the minor’s birth or expected birth” or (2) the child is six
months or older and the parents “did not exercise parental responsibility for a period
of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition.” Id.
151. See id. § 3-504(b).

SMITH MACRO DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

Termination of Parental Rights as a Private Remedy 1202

Abandonment and non-support may also be grounds in parentinitiated termination petitions outside of the adoption context.152
However, the case law reveals that many of these cases are adoptionadjacent, meaning that there is a potential adoption petitioner in the
picture, and the termination proceeding is a likely precursor to an
adoption filing by that person. 153
B. Abuse of the Child or Other Parent
In addition to abandonment and non-support—that is, a parent’s
failure to act in certain ways—many private termination laws include
categories of specific conduct as a basis for a private TPR petition.
Some laws or court opinions, using standards the same as or similar to
those applied in dependency proceedings, permit termination of
parental rights based on findings of abuse or neglect of the child, 154
which essentially creates a private right of action for such conduct.155
152. See, e.g., T.P. v. T.W., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 477, 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding that mother has standing to seek termination of father on basis of
abandonment outside of the adoption context). See generally Wendee M.
Hilderbrand, When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The Inconsistency
and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights, 56
VAND. L. REV. 1907 (2003) (identifying the inconsistency and inequality present in
existing parental rights laws, which prevent a natural parent from terminating the
other natural parent’s rights after prolonged abandonment).
153. See, e.g., In re Angellica W., 714 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)
(noting in review of facts that stepmother “would be in a position to adopt” the child
if mother’s parental rights were terminated); Margaret Y. v. John Y., No. 1 CA-JV
19-0051, 2019 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1021, at *10–11 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 17,
2019) (mentioning children’s bonds with stepmother who wishes to adopt them as
part of “best interest” analysis); In re H.J., 200 A.3d 891, 893 (N.H. 2018)
(petitioning mother sought TPR so that her husband could adopt children).
154. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.502(1)(b), (c) (West 2021)
(permitting waiver of a parent’s consent to adoption based on findings that the parent
“had inflicted or allowed to be inflicted upon the child, by other than accidental
means, serious physical injury” or “continuously or repeatedly inflicted or allowed
to be inflicted upon the child, by other than accidental means, physical injury or
emotional harm”); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-310(a)(2) (2021) (“The parent has
subjected his or her child to aggravated circumstances”). See HOLLINGER, supra note
100, at § 4.04[1][a][i], [iii].
155. See, e.g., MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-17-7(1) (2021) (cross-referencing public
dependency termination standard as grounds for waiving a parent’s objection to
adoption); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7823(a)(1) (West 2021) (allowing termination based
on evidence that the “child has been neglected or cruelly treated” by one or both
parents, including sexual abuse); IDAHO CODE § 16-2005(1)(b) (2021) (“The parent
has neglected or abused the child.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.502(1)(b) (West
2021) (“the parent . . . inflicted or allowed to be inflicted upon the child, by other
than accidental means, serious physical injury”). See In re Austin T., 2006 ME 28,
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Private termination proceedings on such grounds appear to be far less
common than those alleging abandonment, likely because conduct
rising to the level of abuse or neglect frequently results in intervention
by a CPS agency and a dependency proceeding.
Some state statutes permit private termination based on a finding
that the parent was convicted of abuse or other violence towards the
child’s other parent, a sibling, or another family member, even if the
child at issue in the case was not harmed or involved.156 Courts tend,
however, to be wary of terminating a parent’s rights based solely on
allegations of their abuse of the petitioning parent. 157
One category of TPR statutes that is framed a bit differently from
the others described here is the laws that permit petitions based on
allegations that the child at issue was conceived from a sexual
assault.158 In such contexts, a statute may even dispense with the
requirement to consider a child’s best interests, addressing only the
narrow question about the circumstances of the child’s conception.159
As discussed in Part V.B,160 this basis for private termination has a
distinct policy basis and rationale. 161
C. Other Grounds for Proving Parental “Unfitness”
Finally, some statutes and court opinions allow termination
orders on the basis of the condition or circumstances only of the parent
at issue and are not directly related to the child or to other parent. 162
¶ 12, 898 A.2d 946, 950 (mother had standing to bring TPR petition under statute
applying in dependency proceedings); see also In re Adoption of K.A.S., 499
N.W.2d 558, 560 (N.D. 1993) (noting that TPR in an adoption proceeding may be
based on any ground under the Juvenile Act or Parentage Act).
156. See, e.g., S.S. v. D.L., 944 So. 2d 553, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (father
allegedly committed sexual abuse of daughter’s friend).
157. See, e.g., In re Termination of Parental Rights of P.A.M., 505 N.W.2d 395,
397–98 (S.D. 1993).
158. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504(a)(4) (2021); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1658(2)(A) (2021); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.180(c)(2) (West
2021); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-3.5-3 (West 2021).
159. See, e.g., tit. 19-A, § 1658(3-A)(A).
160. See infra notes 367369–378380 and accompanying text.
161. In re Adoption of A.F.M., 15 P.3d 258, 267 (Alaska 2001).
162. See Fairfax, supra note 91, at 147–48 (2011) (noting that grounds for
involuntary termination of parental rights of a non-consenting parent may include
“mental illness, deficiency, or chronic substance use” and conviction of a felony);
HARALAMBIE, supra note 100, § 14:14 (noting that grounds for waiving a parent’s

SMITH MACRO DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

Termination of Parental Rights as a Private Remedy 1204

Such allegations are often asserted in conjunction with those of
abandonment and non-support.163 These grounds have their origins in
the Progressive Era’s conceptualization of “neglect” as encompassing
not only a parent’s failure to care for a child but also their “unfitness”
to occupy the role of a parent, due, for example, to their “immoral
behavior” or “drunkenness.”164 In contemporary laws, such conditions
or circumstances of a parent could include their substance use, mental
illness, moral character, criminal history, or current incarceration. 165
For example, Vermont’s adoption statute permits termination of
a parent’s right to consent if they committed a “crime of violence” or
violated a protection order and such crime or violation indicates that
the parent is “unfit to maintain a relationship of parent and child with
the minor.”166 Florida’s statute allows a parent’s rights to be
terminated for criminal conduct based on the length of incarceration—

consent can include “mental unfitness,” “judicial determination of incompetence,”
and incarceration); HOLLINGER, supra note 100, § 4.04[1][a][v]–[viii] (discussing
grounds for termination of parental rights other than abuse, neglect, and
abandonment).
163. See, e.g., K.S.B. v. M.C.B., 219 So. 3d 650, 654–55 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)
(allegations of mental illness and use controlled substances); Margaret Y. v. John
Y., No. 1 CA-JV 19-0051, 2019 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1021, at *3 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Sept. 17, 2019) (allegations of abandonment, mental illness, and substance
use); In re Angellica W., 714 A.2d 1265, 1271 (Conn. Ct. App. 1998) (allegations
of abandonment and substance use); In re Interest of L.F., No. 02-19-00421-CV,
2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3879, at *19 (Tex. Ct. App. May 7, 2020) (allegations of
substance use and criminal behavior).
164. MASON, supra note 2, at 104; see ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 59–67 (noting
how state intervention in families of color is often based on “cultural prejudice” and
stereotypes of “Black maternal unfitness”); In re Adoption of W.K., 163 N.E.3d 370,
375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“Termination cases [based on allegations of parental
unfitness] have considered factors such as a parent’s substance abuse, mental health,
willingness to follow recommended treatment, lack of insight, instability in housing
and employment, and ability to care for a child’s special needs.”).
165. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7824 (Deering 2021) (setting for grounds for
termination of rights of “[p]arents suffering from disability due to alcohol, or
controlled substances, or moral depravity”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-15-121 (2021)
(including as potential grounds for TPR a parent’s “severe mental illness or
deficiency,” “habitual alcoholism or other drug addiction,” an conviction of any of
an enumerated list of felonies); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.106 (LexisNexis 2021)
(listing several “condition[s]” a court may consider when determining “neglect by
or unfitness of a parent” including “[e]motional illness, mental illness or mental
deficiency,” “[e]xcessive use of intoxicating liquors, controlled substances or
dangerous drugs,” and conviction of a crime “of such a nature as to indicate the
unfitness of the parent.”).
166. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504(a)(3) (2021).

SMITH MACRO DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

1205

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 72:1173

”a significant portion of the child’s minority” 167—and a finding that
the parent has been convicted one of a list of specific serious violent
crimes or falls into one of several enumerated categories of serious
“offenders.”168
While a parent’s failure to visit, contact, or support a child may
be due to the parent’s incarceration,169 courts nonetheless allow
findings of “abandonment” or “non-support” in such circumstances.170
In some state statutes, incarceration alone is a ground for termination,
even if the charge involved is unrelated to the parent’s relationship to
their child and regardless of the parent’s efforts to contact the child.171
These statutes imply that incarceration in itself is deemed to be an
extended failure by the parent to exercise their parental role.172
Florida’s termination statute, which includes a catchall “harmful to the
child” finding for incarcerated parents, suggests that even if the
incarceration is not lengthy or for a serious violent offense, it could
still be the basis for a termination order. 173
Substance use is another basis asserted frequently by petitioners
in private TPR cases, as revealed in the case law. 174 For example, an
Arkansas Appeals Court affirmed the termination of parental rights of
a mother who did not consent to her child’s adoption based on her

167. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(d)(1), (2) (West 2021).
168. Id. (“The incarcerated parent has been determined by the court to be a
violent career criminal as defined in s. 775.084, a habitual violent felony offender as
defined in s. 775.084, or a sexual predator as defined in s. 775.21; has been convicted
of first degree or second degree murder in violation of s. 782.04 or a sexual battery
that constitutes a capital, life, or first degree felony violation of s. 794.011 . . .”).
169. David S. v. Jared H., 308 P.3d 862, 870 (Alaska 2013) (affirming finding
that father’s incarceration did not excuse his failure to communicate with his
daughter for more than a year); In re K.S., No. 16-0605, 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS
1088, at *7–9 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2016) (vacating TPR order based on
abandonment due to father’s incarceration).
170. See, e.g., In re H.J., 200 A.3d 891, 894–95 (N.H. 2018).
171. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-2005(1)(e) (2021).
172. See, e.g., id. (“The court may grant an order terminating the relationship
where it finds that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child
and . . . (e) The parent has been incarcerated and is likely to remain incarcerated for
a substantial period of time during the child’s minority.”). See HARALAMBIE, supra
note 100, § 13:16.
173. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(d)(3) (West 2021).
174. See, e.g., In re Interest of L.F., No. 02-19-00421-CV, 2020 Tex. App.
LEXIS 3879, at *17–18 (Tex. Ct. App. May 7, 2020) (“Mother’s drug use was the
most significant danger to the girls’ well-being.”).

SMITH MACRO DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

Termination of Parental Rights as a Private Remedy 1206

alleged neglect of the child resulting from her chronic alcoholism. 175
Given the potential for recovery from substance use disorders, some
courts consider the parent’s efforts to undergo available treatment in
their determination.176 Such considerations by a court, however,
sometimes reflect stigma and a judgmental attitude toward substance
abuse rather than an informed understanding of either the disorders
involved or the challenges of recovery. 177 For example, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota affirmed the termination of a father’s rights on
the basis of his “deprivation of the children” due to his failure to follow
the requirements of his recovery program. 178 While, in fact, a person’s
“relapse” is likely to be indicative of the non-linear nature of
recovery,179 the court reasoned that it “demonstrates an indifference
toward one’s obligations and responsibilities as a parent.” 180
D. The Best Interests of the Child
As a predicate to terminating a parent’s rights, a court must find
that the parent’s conduct, condition, or circumstances demonstrate
their “incompetence” or “unfitness” as a parent. 181 Most state laws also
175. Ducharme v. Gregory, 435 S.W.3d 14, 18–19 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014).
176. See A.S. C.N.D. v. C.M.A.S., 920 N.W.2d 301, 304–05 (N.D. 2018).
177. See ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 154–57 (discussing the termination of
parental rights in public child welfare cases because of the conflict between the short
timeline for achieving “permanency” often conflicts with the “clock of parental
recovery from substance use” and that courts “sometimes base the decision to
terminate parents’ rights based on an erroneous understanding of addiction and the
recovery process”); Richard C. Boldt, Evaluating Histories of Substance Abuse in
Cases Involving the Termination of Parental Rights, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y
135, 142 (1999); see also Jun Sung Hong et al., Termination of Parental Rights for
Parents with Substance Use Disorder: For Whom and Then What? 29 SOC. WORK
IN PUB. HEALTH, 503, 512–14 (2014) (noting the role of compliance with substance
use treatment as a factor in termination orders in dependency cases).
178. A.S. C.N.D., 920 N.W.2d at 305.
179. Boldt, supra note 177, at 143 (“Often relapses, when identified and
addressed, represent a phase in the process of recovery, from which a parent can
learn and advance toward the ultimate goal of abstinence.”).
180. A.S. C.N.D., 920 N.W.2d at 304 (quoting Johnson v. Cass Cnty. Soc. Servs.
(In re E.R.), 688 N.W.2d 384, 388 (N.D. 2004)); see Alyssa W. v Justin G., 433 P.3d
3, 5–6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018) (holding where one parent seeks to terminate the
parental rights of another based on substance use, the petitioner must show that
treatment options were offered to the parent “but the parent’s alcohol abuse was not
amenable to rehabilitative services, or that providing such services would be
pointless.”).
181. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Tobias D., 2012 ME 45, ¶ 16, 40 A.3d 990, 996
(“[T]he court may not even contemplate the child’s best interest until it has found at
least one ground of parental unfitness”); see also MASON, supra note 2, at 104.
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require a further, distinct analysis of whether the termination would be
“in the best interest of the child.”182 As Professor Jessica Feinberg has
explained, “[t]he best interests analysis does not come into play in
involuntary termination actions unless the parental unfitness standard
is satisfied, and even then it serves only as a safety net to prevent
termination of parental rights where it would be contrary to the child’s
best interests despite the parent’s unfitness.” 183
The two standards are, however, often conflated in opinions, and
many courts, failing to parse the distinction, appear to give short shrift
to the best interest analysis if a finding of “unfitness” is made. Rather,
given the flexibility and subjectivity of the standard, as many of its
critics note, most courts readily find that, if a parent is determined to
be unfit under the first step in the analysis, termination would be in the
child’s best interest.184 But such a finding does not necessarily follow.
Courts often use the standard, which is a staple of custody
determinations, to transform what should be an analysis of the
adequacy of a factual basis to sever a parent’s constitutionally
protected interest into a comparison of the adults in a child’s life. 185 A
court can easily confuse the crucial question in a termination case (“Is
this parent unfit?”) with the central question in a custody case (“Which
home is better for the child?”).186
182. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. See JACOBS, supra note 86, at
§ 3:01 (“Some state courts will not enter a termination order without a separate
finding of ‘best interest.’ In other jurisdictions, the ‘best interest’ requirement seems
implicit in the findings of grounds for severance.”).
183. Jessica Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal of the Marital Presumption for
the Modern Era, 104 MINN. L. REV. 243, 294 (2019).
184. See, e.g., Janet L Dolgin, Why Has the Best-Interest Standard Survived?:
The Historic and Social Context, 16 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 2, 2 (1996) (“[I]nvoking
children’s interests as the guiding principle in such cases can disguise other agendas
that serve neither the particular children at issue nor children in general.”);
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 20 at 38–40 (“A best interests inquiry is not a neutral
investigation that leads to an obvious result. It is an intensely value-laden inquiry.
And it cannot be otherwise.” or “The best interest standard necessarily invites the
judge to rely on his or her own values and biases to decide the case in whatever way
the judge thinks best.”).
185. See Dolgin, supra note 184, at 3 (“By focusing on the traits of potential
custodians, the needs and interests of children can become secondary to those of
contending adults. In consequence, courts can inadvertently focus on the ‘best
interests’ of adults rather than of children.”).
186. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have little doubt
that the Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[if] a State were to attempt to force
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Particularly in the context of a contested stepparent adoption,
courts tend to frame the best interest analysis not in terms of the impact
on the child of severing a parent’s legal relationship with them but in
terms of the benefits to the child of being adopted by one of their
current caregivers.187 As a result, courts may overlook the potential
impact on the child’s short- and long-term interests from the
termination, such as those noted earlier. 188 Further, any comparison
between an “old” versus “new” parent is inherently disadvantageous
to the existing parent, given that the potential adoptive parent is most
likely in an active caretaking and co-parenting role with the person
who was already awarded physical custody of the child. 189 While
federal and state policy around family preservation purport to limit
termination in dependency cases even if another family, such as a
foster family, might provide a “better” home for a child, this restraint
is not prevalent in the private context. 190 I explore the implications of
this trend further in Part V.
IV. PROCEDURAL DISPARITIES IN PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE
the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children,
without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought
to be in the children’s best interest.’” (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for
Equity & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in
judgment)).
187. See, e.g., Sanders v. Savage, 468 S.W.3d 795, 801 (Ark. 2015) (indicating
potential adopting father was a regular part of the children’s lives); see also, e.g.,
T.W. v. M.C. (In re Interest of Baby A.), 363 P.3d 193, 206–08 (Colo. 2016)
(holding that adoptive parents may present evidence of their suitability for placement
as part of the child’s best interests).
188. See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., In re Noreen G., 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(noting children’s “deep attachment to [their legal] guardians and a secure home
with them” as part of best interest analysis in termination of parental rights petition
brought by the guardians as part of their adoption petition); see also, e.g., In re
Adoption of K.L.P., 735 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (noting that trial
court’s best interest determination in a termination proceeding was based in part on
expert testimony that the adoption would be in the children’s best interest).
190. Justice Potter Stewart observed in his concurrence in Smith v. Org. of
Foster Families for Equality & Reform:
[A]ny case where the foster parents had assumed the emotional role of the
child’s natural parents would represent not a triumph of the system, to be
constitutionally safeguarded from state intrusion, but a failure. The goal of
foster care . . . is not to provide a permanent substitute for the natural or
adoptive home, but to prepare the child for his return to his real parents or
placement in a permanent adoptive home by giving him temporary shelter in
a family setting.
Smith, 431 U.S. at 861–62 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
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TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS
Courts must follow demanding standards and ensure robust
procedural protections before terminating a parent’s rights. States
have greater latitude in limiting claims of parentage than in severing a
recognized parent-child legal relationship. 191 Once someone is
deemed a “parent” under state law, constitutional protections limit
interference with or deprivation of the rights associated with that legal
status.192 The U.S. Supreme Court spelled out the constitutional
implications of termination of parental rights in the 1982 opinion in
Santosky v. Kramer.193 The Court held that, in line with the “historical
recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is
a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment,” a “clear and convincing evidence” level of proof is
required to terminate a parent’s rights. 194 Justice Harry Blackmun
explained in the majority opinion:
[T]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are
strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable
destruction of their family life.195

Thus, the Court reasoned, “When the State moves to destroy weakened
familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair
procedures.”196 Private termination cases, especially when brought by
one parent against the other, are often litigated and adjudicated much
191. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
192. Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483,
1485–86 (2018).
193. 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982).
194. Id. at 753–56 (first citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978);
then citing Smith, 431 U.S. at 845; then citing Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
499 (1977); then citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40
(1974); then citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52 (1972); then citing
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); then citing Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); and then citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923)).
195. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; see M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116–17
(1996) (“[T]he State’s authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, demands
the close consideration the Court has long required when a family association so
undeniably important is at stake.”).
196. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753–54.
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like a child custody dispute between parents. The potential outcome—
and often the grounds—in such cases, however, are more like those in
a dependency proceeding, the far more common context for
termination petitions, than those in a custody case.197 Statutes do not
always provide clear guidance for courts regarding which kind of
proceeding should serve as the model for a private TPR matter, which
is essentially a hybrid of the two.198 In the absence of clearly mandated
procedures, the private nature of the petition leads many courts to
provide fewer procedural protections for the parent who is the subject
of the proceeding. This is significant in two key respects: (1) whether,
before a parent’s rights can be terminated, the parent is entitled to
support and opportunity for rehabilitation and for reunification with
their child; and (2) whether the parent is entitled to court-appointed
counsel.
A. Opportunities for Rehabilitation and Reunification
When a court conducts a TPR proceeding in a dependency case
brought by a public CPS agency, in most instances there has already
been a removal proceeding involving “reasonable efforts” at family
reunification, a judicial review of the proposed out-of-home
placement, and one or more further hearings in which the court has
determined that such efforts should not continue. 199 These actions and
determinations are prerequisites to a termination order in public
dependency cases. 200 Such proceedings, which may involve multiple
197. See JACOBS, supra note 86, at § 3.02.
198. See, e.g., In re Austin T., 2006 ME 28, ¶8, 898 A.2d 946, 950 (holding that
a court should apply the dependency statute’s requirements in post-judgment
termination of parental rights action brought by one parent against another); Ex parte
Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950, 955 (Ala. 1990) (court divided on whether a parent
petitioning to terminate other parent’s rights must establish that child is
“dependent.”).
199. See Darla D. v. Grace R., 382 P.3d 1000, 1015 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016)
(quoting Thomas-Lott v. Earles, 2002-NMCA-103, 9, 132 N.M. 772, 777, 55 P.3d
984, 989).
200. Id. (“[T]he path to permanency in an abuse and neglect case—whether that
means reunification, or alternatively, termination of parental rights and adoption—
is staked out by a statutory scheme that contemplates [CPS] involvement at every
stage, overseen by the court.”); GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 12, at xxii–
xxiii (“[C]hild welfare professionals seek to assist families to overcome the obstacles
to the safe return of their children and to do so quickly. Only when the parents fail
to change their ways or prove unable to raise their children safely for the foreseeable
future do the state’s interests and that of parents’ truly diverge [leading to a
termination proceeding].”); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2018); see generally
JACOBS, supra note 86, at § 2 (describing the dependency process).
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court dates and guardian ad litem reports, may last for several months
or even longer.201 During this time, the state’s reunification efforts
may consist of a range of services and supports, such as treatment for
problems relating to the parents’ mental health or substance use or
provision of professionally supervised contact between the parents and
their child.202 The lengthy and detailed record that results from these
efforts, especially the outcome of opportunities provided to parents to
rehabilitate and reunify with their children, can assist the court in its
termination determination.203
Private termination determinations, by contrast, are made in a
procedural context that lacks most or all of these preliminary steps and
findings. Because the state CPS agency is not a party to the petition
and the private petitioners are not in a position to provide or arrange
services to the parent subject to it, a court cannot, as a practical matter,
order “reasonable efforts” at reunification 204 as a prerequisite to the
TPR—even if such requirement were included in a private termination
statute.205 This means that a court may apply an abandonment
standard, for example, to a parent who was not provided any
opportunity or resources to engage in their child’s life. It is all the more
questionable to apply an abandonment standard if a parent has never
played a role in the child’s life but now states that they wish to do so.
In some cases of estrangement between the parents, the notification of
201. See, e.g., Darla D., 382 P.3d at 1005.
202. See, e.g., id. at 1015 (quoting N.M. STAT ANN. § 32-4-21(B)(10) (West
2009)).
203. See Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse and
Neglect Cases Between Disposition and Permanency, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 13,
13–14 (2010).
204. 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(B), 672(a)(2)(A)(ii).
205. See, e.g., In re Adoption of L.E., 2012 ME 127, ¶ 13, 56 A.3d 1234, 1238
(holding that a court is not required to order attempts at reunification before granting
termination of parental rights petition filed in conjunction with an adoption); In re
T.S.T., 571 S.E.2d 416, 418 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that father, who petitioned
to terminate mother’s parental rights to their three children, was not required to
comply with the termination of parental rights statute’s reunification plan
requirements because the statute provided that a reunification plan was only required
when the court removed a child from the home and placed it in the custody of the
Department of Human Resources); In re Bush, 749 P.2d 492, 496 (Idaho 1988) (trial
court was not required by statute to make a finding “as to whether the parents could
or could not have been rehabilitated prior to a termination of their parental rights” in
an action brought by private parties). See also Gupta-Kagan, supra note 64, at 875–
82 (discussing the disadvantages and risks to the child and family when a CPS
agency does not work with a family and provide services under court supervision).
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an adoption and TPR proceeding may be the first time a parent has
learned of the current location of their child. 206
In a 2017 opinion in an adoption case in which the mother of the
child and her current husband had successfully petitioned to terminate
the father’s rights, Adoption of Isabelle T.,207 the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court summarized its concerns about the disadvantages for a
parent in a private termination proceeding:
There is no state assertion of parental unfitness in private
termination/adoption proceedings, and the Adoption Act
provides fewer protections for parents than those provided in
. . . child protection proceedings. Individuals facing the loss of
their rights in [dependency] termination of parental rights
proceedings are nearly always provided opportunities for
rehabilitation and reunification before a court even considers
the termination of their parental rights.
The Adoption Act, on the other hand, does not require—or
even authorize—the court to consider rehabilitation or
reunification efforts prior to terminating parental rights. A
termination action litigated as part of a “private adoption,”
where the adoption petitioner—often one parent—seeks to
terminate the parental rights of a nonconsenting parent to
facilitate an adoption, requires only that the petitioner prove
that the grounds for termination have been met in order for the
court to permanently terminate that parent’s legal rights to his
or her child.
In a . . . child protection proceeding, the question of
termination is addressed only after a court has decided that the
parent’s unfitness is so dire that the children must be removed
from his or her care. And, even in those circumstances, the
parent is nonetheless usually offered multiple opportunities to
better his or her parenting abilities and reunify with the
children through court-ordered and state-provided services.208

206. See FAIRFAX, supra note 91, at 123–36.
207. Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 1, 175 A.3d 639, 643.
208. Id. at ¶ 11–13, 175 A.3d at 645 (first citing In re Heather C., 2000 ME 99,
¶ 4, 751 A.2d 448, 450; then citing In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 26, 854 A.2d
195, 203; and then citing Adoption of L.E., 2012 ME 127, ¶ 13, 56 A.3d 1234, 1238).
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the probate court’s order terminating a
father’s rights in that case because he “had no opportunity to receive rehabilitative
services, and . . . he has been prohibited from having contact with his children.” Id.
at ¶ 35, 175 A.3d at 649.
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While other courts similarly identify the disadvantages to parents
in private versus public termination cases, most of them have not
found a constitutional dimension to such differences. Rather, courts
regard the protections in child protection statutes that give rise to rights
to reunification opportunities and the services needed to support them
as statutory benefits granted to parents involved in dependency
matters.209 If a private TPR petition is brought under a different
statute—even one that cross-references the statutory grounds for
termination in a dependency statute—or the action is one is converted
from a dependency to private termination proceeding, there is no
entitlement to the same opportunities and services as parents in
dependency cases.210
Some courts or statutes allow consideration of the extent of
opportunities for rehabilitation and reunification in private termination
cases, but such allowances are still short of what is required in
dependency cases. For example, an Arizona appeals court reasoned
that because “[s]everance proceedings implicate the same
fundamental constitutional liberty interests of a parent, whether
commenced by DCS or a private party,” the petitioning party in any
TPR proceeding must prove that the parent was offered “reunification
services” before the parent’s rights may be terminated.211
Nevertheless, an individual petitioner has no obligation to do the
“offering.” Instead, in a private termination matter, the petitioner must
prove that the “parent whose rights are to be severed has either already
received or been offered the necessary rehabilitative services from
some provider to no avail or that engaging the parent in rehabilitative
services would be futile.” 212 The court held in that case that the
petitioning mother had satisfied the burden of proof because the
father’s alcoholism was an issue in an earlier parental rights and
responsibilities case, as a result of which his rights were already
209. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Riahleigh M., 2019 ME 24, ¶ 27–36, 202 A.3d
1174, 1183–85; In re Infant Child Skinner, 982 P.2d 670, 675 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999).
210. See, e.g. In Re Adoption of M.P.J., No. W2007-00379-COA-R3-PT, 2007
Tenn. App. LEXIS 724, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2007) (holding that father
had no right to rehabilitation services after custody of child was transferred from the
state to the child’s aunt who later petitioned to terminate father’s rights); In re D.C.,
737 S.E.2d 182, 184–85 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
211. Alyssa W. v. Justin G., 433 P.3d 3, 5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
212. Id. at 5–6.
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limited, and he had not sufficiently addressed his alcohol use by the
time of the termination proceedings.213 In a more recent opinion, that
court limited its earlier holding by stating that there is no entitlement
to consideration of reunification services if the alleged grounds for
severance of parental rights is abandonment. 214
Similarly, in response to the concerns raised in Isabelle T., the
Maine Legislature amended the state’s adoption statute to include
language to require a court reviewing a termination petition in the
context of an adoption to consider “the extent to which the parent who
is the subject of the petition had opportunities to rehabilitate and to
reunify with the child or to maintain a relationship with the child,
including actions by the child’s other parent to foster or to interfere
with a relationship between the parent and the child or services
provided by public or nonprofit entities.”215 Even here, however, as in
the statutes discussed above that recognize the disadvantages to a
parent who is the target of a private TPR petition, no path to
reunification or guarantee of services is provided.
California’s adoption statute is another example of the far more
limited protections for parents subject to TPR orders in the context of
a private adoption than those available in a dependency proceeding. 216
A court may terminate a parent’s rights to enable a legal guardian to
adopt a child if the guardianship order has been in place for two years
or longer and the TPR order is found to be in the child’s best
interest.217 Once the two-year period has passed, the guardian need not
prove any specific parental “unfitness” to obtain a TPR order.218 As in
213. Id. at 7.
214. See Margaret Y. v. John Y., No. 1 CA-JV 19-0051, 2019 Ariz. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 1021, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2019) (citing Toni W. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 993 P.2d 462, 465–67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
215. ME. REV. STAT.. tit. 18-C, § 9-204(3-A) (2021); see Adoption of Tobias
D., 2012 ME 45, ¶ 23, 40 A.3d 990, 998 (holding that a court should consider the
extent of a parent’s opportunity to form a relationship with the child).
216. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1516.5 (a)(1)–(3) (West 2021).
217. Id.; see, e.g., Guardianship of Ann S., 202 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Cal. 2009).
218. See, e.g., In re Noreen G., 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(“Nothing more must be proved than that termination of parental rights and adoption
by the guardian are ‘in the ‘best interests of the child.’’”) (quoting Guardianship of
Ann. S., 202 P.3d at 1129); In re Guardianship of Robert S., No. F060073, 2011 WL
2152626, at *20–21 (Cal. Ct. App. June 2, 2011) (the Supreme Court of California
rejected a due process challenge to the statute in a 2009 opinion and reasoned: “[T]he
parental fitness standard, which protects parents’ interest in child custody, is not
necessarily required at a [termination] hearing. By that stage, the parent-child family
unit has ceased to exist and the parent’s entitlement to custody is not at issue. It
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a dependency proceeding, the parent is given a deadline to “fix” the
circumstances leading to the child being in the care of another. 219 In
the private guardianship-to-termination context, however, the parents
are provided no opportunities or services to make the changes required
to terminate the guardianship and stop the clock. 220 The disparity is
explicitly noted by the California Supreme Court in a 2009 opinion,
Guardianship of Ann S.:
Unlike dependency cases, [guardianships] are not regularly
supervised by the court and a social services agency. No
governmental entity is a party to the proceedings. It is the
family members and the guardians who determine, with court
approval, whether a guardianship is established, and thereafter
whether parent and child will be reunited, or the guardianship
continued, or an adoption sought . . .221
Acknowledging this disparity, some courts have held that, prior
to a TPR order in a private action, there must be a report or referral to
a CPS agency regarding the child at issue.222 Such a report or referral
would be anomalous to require proof in every case, by clear and convincing
evidence, that a mother or father who has had no custodial responsibilities for two
or more years is currently an unfit parent.”); see also Ann S., 202 P.3d at 1094–95
(Cal. 2009). In that case, the mother struggled with substance use and enrolled in
rehabilitation programs while the guardianship was in place. Id. Further, the court
wrote that it “would make little sense” to apply a parental unfitness standard there
because “[a]s guardianship continues for an extended period, the child develops an
interest in a stable, continuing placement, and the guardian acquires a recognized
interest in the care and custody of the child.” Id. at 1094 (citing PROB. § 1516.5).
219. PROB. § 1516.5 (a)(1)–(3).
220. Id.
221. Ann S., 202 P.3d at 1096–97. The Court also noted that there is “no periodic
court review of the placement” nor is “the parent given the rehabilitation services
that the county provided to parents of dependent children.” Id. at 1098 (first citing
Guardianship of Stephen G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 409, 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); and
then citing Guardianship of Kaylee J., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 664–66 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997)). See generally Deirdre M. Smith, Keeping it in the Family: Minor
Guardianship as Private Child Protection, 18 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 269, 310–13
(2019) (discussing implications of using minor guardianship as a form of “child
protection” outside of the public child welfare system). See also Noreen G., 105 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 534–36 (rejecting mother’s due process challenge to guardianship-totermination statute on the basis that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because
it “fails to give a parent adequate notice as to what actions he or she must take to
avoid the termination of his or her parental rights”; the court concluded that the
statutory language “in the physical custody of the guardian for a period of not less
than two years” provides sufficient notice to parents).
222. See, e.g., In re Vincent D, 65 Conn. App. 658, 661 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
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could transform a private case into a quasi-dependency proceeding or,
if the allegations against the parent are serious enough, into a full
dependency proceeding initiated by the state. For example, two years
after the Ann S. opinion, a California appeals court vacated a TPR
order based in part on the trial court’s “critical error” in failing to refer
the family to the county CPS agency for an investigation and
determination of whether, given the guardian’s allegations of parental
unfitness, a dependency petition should be filed or “the family offered
services.”223 Such error, the appeals court reasoned, “affected the
entire proceeding” because:
It deprived the parents of the opportunity to gain custody of
their children through dependency proceedings and deprived
them of all the attendant safeguards in those proceedings not
available in guardianship proceedings. It allowed the
guardianship proceeding to move forward without providing
the parents an adequate opportunity to regain custody of their
children.224
A New Mexico appeals court raised similar concerns about
parental rights being terminated for adoption by a guardian with no
involvement by a public CPS agency.225 In Darla D. v. Grace R., the
court stated that, without such involvement, such private termination
petitions “would be ripe for abuse.” 226 The court held that the only
construction of the state’s adoption statute consistent with the policy
aims of the state’s overall public child welfare scheme is the
223. In re Guardianship of Robert S., 2011 WL 2152626, at *6, *20–21, *24.
The court also interpreted Ann S. and the statute narrowly as applying only where a
parent consents to the guardianship and does not seek to terminate the guardianship
prior to the hearing. Id. at *20. The court vacated the termination order against both
parents, as well as the underlying guardianship, in that case because they had
objected to the guardianship “from the outset,” gave up custody for only a brief time
“in order to find suitable housing” to the family member who became the guardian,
and “continued on their path to rehabilitation and were successful at it.” Id. at *23.
224. Id. at *24. The mother asserted in her appeal that the court’s failure to make
such referral:
deprived her and the agency of a dependency court proceeding, thereby
depriving mother and children of all the rights afforded to a family in a
dependency proceeding. Mother asserts that if this case had proceeded in the
dependency court, she would have been successful in having her children
returned to her. She was prejudiced by not having the opportunity to have
social services determine if the case should proceed under the dependency
law.
Id. at *18.
225. Darla D. v. Grace R., 382 P.3d 1000,1005 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016).
226. Id. at 1016.
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requirement that such a case be referred to the CPS agency and, so that
the parents whose rights would be terminated could have the benefit
of the resulting “procedural safeguards,” that the agency make
reasonable efforts to reunify a child with their parents “whenever
possible.” 227
In neither the California nor the New Mexico cases, however, was
it clear that the required referrals to CPS agencies would in fact lead
to the provision of appropriate services for the parent and child. Due
to limited resources, many CPS agencies or the nonprofits with which
they contract only provide services and supports to families who are
or likely could be the subject of a dependency proceeding; and, even
for those families, the services provided often fall short of what is
needed for rehabilitation and reunification. 228
While the disparities discussed here are significant, I do not
suggest that private TPR cases should be prosecuted by public
agencies. On the contrary, given limits and harms that can result from
the full intervention of a child welfare agency into a troubled family
situation, such public prosecution is not a positive alternative to a
private TPR action. There is already far too much state intervention in
families; the services provided to parents and children are woefully
inadequate; state agencies are too quick to seek orders for the
termination of parents’ rights; and courts are too quick to grant such
orders. These trends have created a culture in which the United States
justice system has become a means of discarding a child’s parents
quickly in the name of “permanency,” often for the convenience of
agencies seeking to lighten their caseload and of courts themselves

227. Id.
228. Martin Guggenheim, General Overview of Child Protection Laws in the
United States, in GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that a
common problem in the operation of child protection laws is parents are required “to
secure services that are either unavailable to them or are not needed” in order to
regain custody of their children) [hereinafter Guggenheim II]; Jeanne M. Kaiser,
Current Issues in Public Policy: Finding A Reasonable Way to Enforce the
Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Protection Cases, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 100, 103–04 (2009) (noting that CPS reasonable efforts “routinely contain a
mix of parenting classes, anger management workshops, and individual therapy,
which when looked at in the context of the needs of the parents involved, appear to
have little to no chance of providing any actual help.”).
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seeking to get cases off their dockets.229 Severing a parent-child
relationship for the sake of bureaucratic expedience has only a tenuous
connection to securing a child’s “welfare.”
The accelerated timelines for termination to “free” a child for
adoption in the public child protection context, as driven by federal
law,230 has likely had a spillover effect in the private termination
realm, especially where a state uses a common standard. The impact
of the rush to permanency on families of color and on those in poverty
or otherwise assigned and held to the margins of our society is
especially dire.231 Incarceration is a basis for both public and private
termination, as are substance use, untreated mental illness, and poverty
(often framed as failing to support a child). 232 In all TPR petitions,
parents’ difficult situations tend to be described in stigmatizing
narratives of blame.233 In the context of a private TPR, the impact is
compounded by the fact that parents receive no mandated opportunity
or support to avoid the extreme outcome of permanently losing their
child. Financial resources, professional supports, compassion, and
patience are what lead to the effective rehabilitation and reunification
of a parent-child relationship.234 It is these measures—not intervention
and separation—that children and families need and deserve.
B. Right to Court-Appointed Counsel
The context in which courts struggle most conspicuously with the
public versus private nature of TPR proceedings is when appeals are
brought by parents asserting that they had a right, in such proceedings,
to court-appointed counsel. As a California appeals court observed in
one such appeal:

229. See ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 223; GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra
note 12, at xxiii (“Many who have worked in the field . . . do not believe that the
intentions of state officials are a sufficient protection against state over-reaching.”).
230. Guggenheim II, supra note 228, at 4–6; Garrison, supra note 48, at 443–
46.
231. See ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 109.
232. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY
TERMINATION
OF
PARENTAL
RIGHTS
1
(2021),
childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf.
233. Matthew I. Fraidin, Changing the Narrative of Child Welfare, 19 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 97, 98–99 (2021); see In re Interest of L.F., No. 02-1900421-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3879, at *23 (Tex. Ct. App. May 7, 2020)
(holding that evidence mother’s “persistent drug abuse” and “related jail
confinement” was sufficient to support best interest finding).
234. Fraidin, supra note 233, at 105–08.
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A stepparent adoption differs from other parental termination
cases in that it is not an action brought by the state and argued
by state attorneys. But neither is the adoption proceeding a
purely private dispute. The state is called upon to exercise its
exclusive authority to terminate the legal relationship of parent
and child and establish a new relationship, in accordance with
an extensive statutory scheme.235
Although most states, either through statutes 236 or through courts’
holdings based on constitutional principles, 237 now provide that
parents targeted by private TPR petitions are entitled to courtappointed counsel, these rules are only recent developments. 238
Several states continue to follow the holding in Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina239 that due
process principles do not require appointment of counsel in all civil
matters, including private TPR cases. 240 A Texas appeals court, for
example, ruled as recently as 2020 that, pursuant to Lassiter, courts
have discretion whether to appoint counsel for parents in private
termination actions even though parents in public dependency actions
have a statutory right to counsel. 241

235. In re Jay R., 197 Cal. Rptr. 672, 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
236. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 9-106(2) (2021) (broad right to counsel for
indigent parents in adoption proceedings); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1658(1-A)(F)
(2021) (right to counsel in private termination proceedings brought by another
parent).
237. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110, 112 (Mass. 2012)
(citing Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v.B., 393 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Mass. 1979)) (holding that,
notwithstanding absence of statutory right, parents are entitled to counsel in adoption
and termination proceedings because of the fundamental constitutional right at stake
in proceeding).
238. In re Adoption of Y.E.F., 171 N.E.3d 302, 306, 308 (Ohio 2020).
239. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32, (1981).
240. In re E.K.S., 387 P.3d 1032, 1037 (Utah 2016) (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S.
at 26) (holding that court must undertake Lassiter analysis on case-by-case basis to
determine right to counsel in privately initiated termination proceedings).
241. In re L.F., No. 02-19-00421-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3879, at *33
(Tex. Ct. App. May 7, 2020) (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32) (holding that due
process “did not demand” appointment of counsel in that case because the
termination petition “contained no allegations against Mother upon which criminal
charges could be based; the case presented no complicated legal issues; and no
expert witnesses testified”); see In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008)
(earlier case before statutory change noting that parents did not have the right to
discretionary appointment of counsel in a privately-initiated termination action).

SMITH MACRO DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

Termination of Parental Rights as a Private Remedy 1220

Where there is no clear statutory right to counsel in a private
termination case, courts’ determinations of whether to find such right
often turns on the extent to which they conclude that the proceeding
involves state action, thereby implicating the parents’ constitutional
rights.242 Some courts conclude that the potential for a termination
order pursuant to a statute is sufficient to find there is state action,
giving rise to an analysis of the right to counsel under the U.S.
Constitution.243 Such conclusions may be based on the Supreme Court
precedent in Troxel v. Granville,244 which struck down a grandparents’
visitation law, or M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,245 an appeal arising from a
stepparent adoption case in which the Court held that an indigent
parent was entitled to a fee-waived transcript of termination
proceedings.246 Other courts conclude there is state action in a private
TPR case when a public CPS agency has a specific role in the case,
such as conducting an investigation before or during the termination
proceedings.247 If state action is found, then courts generally hold that
a parent is entitled to court-appointed counsel either on the basis of
due process principles 248 or, given that parents who are the subject of

242. See In re Application to Adopt H.B.S.C., 12 P.3d 916, 920–21 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2000) (first citing In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 283 (Alaska 1991); then citing
O.A.H. v. R.L.A., 712 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); and then citing In re
Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 565–66 (N.D. 1993)).
243. See, e.g., id. (first citing K.L.J., 813 P.2d at 283; then citing O.A.H., 712
So. 2d at 6; and then citing K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d at 565–66)); A.W.S. v. A.W., 2014
MT 322, 377 Mont. 234, ¶ 14, 339 P.3d 414, 417–18 (Mont. 2014) (first citing
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; then citing K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d at 566); In re Adoption of
Y.E.F., 171 N.E.3d 302, 311 (Ohio 2020) (citing In re L.T.M., 824 N.E.2d 221, 230
(Ill. 2005)).
244. 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000).
245. 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996).
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., In re Jay R., 197 Cal. Rptr. 672, 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (basing
state action finding on both the “extensive statutory scheme” and the requirement
for a CPS investigation of every stepparent adoption petition); K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d
at 566 (first citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-09(1)(i) (2021); then citing N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-15-11(5) (2021)) (state is required to be a named party, although it is not
obligated to participate in the proceeding); Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773, 777–
78 (Or. 1990).
248. See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.E.V., 141 A.3d 254, 264 (N.J. 2016) (basing
holding on the New Jersey Constitution). Applying Matthews and Lassiter, the court
noted: “Both the public and the State have a strong interest in seeing that children
are adopted in appropriate cases. Because an adoption terminates parental rights,
N.J.S.A. 9:3–50(c)(1), the public, the State, and the parent also share an ‘interest in
an accurate and just decision.’” Id. at 265–66 (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
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a dependency termination action are entitled to counsel, on the basis
of an equal protection analysis.249
The Illinois courts’ examination of the right to counsel in private
termination proceedings provides a good example of the variation
among courts on the right to counsel in such cases. An appeals court
held that a privately-initiated TPR proceeding in an adoption case
involved state action because “respondent’s parental rights could be
terminated only pursuant to a comprehensive statutory scheme” and
“a specific procedure of the state is being challenged.”250 On appeal,
the Illinois Supreme Court rejected that conclusion, holding that “the
mere fact that the state court is the forum for the dispute” was an
insufficient basis to find state action. 251 Instead, based on a factspecific inquiry of that case, the court found state action because the
children had been placed in the adoption petitioners’ care as the result
of an earlier removal proceeding initiated by the state under the
dependency statute.252 The court upheld the appeals court’s conclusion
that the parents’ equal protection rights were violated because they
would have been entitled to counsel if the termination proceeding had
been brought under the dependency statute. 253 The Illinois Supreme
Court extended its holding three years later to require the appointment
of counsel for any parent who is the subject of a termination
249. See, e.g., In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 651 (Iowa 2004); A.W.S., 339
P.3d at 419; Y.E.F., 171 N.E.3d at 313; Zockert, 800 P.2d at 779 (quoting Hale v.
Port of Portland, 783 P.2d 506, 515 (Or. 1988)).
250. In re Adoption of K.L.P., 735 N.E.2d 1071, 1077 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
251. In re Adoption of K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 751 (Ill. 2002) (first citing
People v. Brown, 660 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Ill. 1995); then citing People v. DiGuida,
604 N.E.2d 336, 346 (Ill. 1992); and then citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1698 (2d ed. 1988)).
252. Id. Justice Freeman issued a concurring opinion questioning the basis for
finding state action on that fact and noting: “The fact that children may have been
removed from a parent’s custody is legally irrelevant to the question of whether his
or her parental rights should be terminated in a subsequent adoption action.” Id. at
755 (Freeman, J., concurring). Quoting the Supreme Court’s holding in Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982), he reasoned: “Regardless of motivations, state
action may be found where ‘the private entity has exercised powers that are
‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’’” Id. at 756 (Freeman, J.,
concurring).
253. See id. at 754. The court held that the only state interest served in the
different treatment of parents depending on whether the termination proceeding was
brought under the dependency statute or the adoption state was the cost savings of
not providing counsel in the latter, which interest is not “compelling” under a
constitutional analysis. K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d at 753.
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proceeding brought under the adoption statute, regardless of the
factual context.254
Of course counsel can be a crucial factor in any case but, even if
a parent has the right to counsel specifically during the termination
proceedings, such right may be of little help to a parent in a
disadvantaged position at the start of the proceedings because they
lacked access to legal representation in a prior proceeding, for
example, a guardianship or custody case in which all of their parental
rights were suspended or were allocated to the person now petitioning
for a permanent termination of those rights.255 The parent’s
unfavorable position here is equivalent to having consequences, such
as a greater punishment, imposed based on a prior uncounseled plea
in a criminal matter. 256 Avoidance of such jeopardy is why it is
essential that access to counsel be provided to parents well before the
proceeding in a TPR case. It ensures the full protection of the parents’
rights and may even minimize the risk of a petition being filed.
V. THE PRIVATE REMEDY RATIONALES FOR PRIVATE TERMINATION
AND ALTERNATIVES WORTH CONSIDERING
As described above, termination of parental rights is an extreme
remedy that eliminates a constitutionally protected interest and
permanently severs a legal relationship between two people. The legal
relationship between a parent and their child can have power and
significance in a range of contexts. This Part examines three explicit
or implicit rationales for permitting the severance of this relationship
when it is sought by an individual as a private remedy: to allow a nonparent to acquire a legal relationship to a child; to sever the custodial
parent’s link to the other parent; and/or to foreclose any potential
exercise of parental rights in the future. While providing private
254. See In re Adoption of L.T.M., 824 N.E.2d 221, 231–32 (Ill. 2005) (“[A]
parent who stands to lose his rights under the Adoption Act if he is found unfit is in
a very similar situation to a parent who stands to lose the very same constitutional
right, based on the very same finding, in proceedings under the Juvenile Court
Act.”).
255. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Robert S., No. F060073, 2011 WL
2152626, at *19 (Cal. Ct. App. June 20, 2011) (noting when vacating termination
order in adoption case brought by her children’s legal guardian that the mother did
not have counsel when the guardianship order was entered that removed the children
from her custody, which was the basis of the later termination order).
256. Cf. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994) (holding that there
is no due process violation for a defendant’s prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction is used to enhance his sentence in a subsequent conviction).
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remedies is an appropriate function of law generally, there is little
acknowledgment or examination of the role of these rationales in
termination of parental rights proceedings outside of the public
dependency context.
To understand the underlying policy rationales at work, we need
to consider whose interests are served when a parent’s rights are
terminated. In the public dependency context, the most common
rationale for terminating a parent’s rights is framed as “permanency”
for the child.257 The termination order facilitates a conclusion to the
proceeding itself; it ends the state’s obligation to support reunification
of the family; and it “frees” the child for adoption or for other lasting
arrangements.258 In private cases, by contrast, “permanency” of this
kind is likely not needed for the child, as the child likely already has a
home with a custodial parent or legal guardian. 259 Rather, the objective
is to render one of the child’s parents a legal stranger. While the
outcome is often framed in terms of a child’s best interest, the primary
beneficiary of this result is the petitioner. Therefore, in TPR cases
brought by private individuals, the termination order functions more
as a remedy for the petitioners than as an exercise of the state’s parens
patriae role towards a child. 260 For this reason, the rationales
articulated by petitioners or the courts involved here differ from those
in the public dependency context, even where the legal effect of the
termination order is the same.
The timing of a petition for TPR needed for adoption, for
example, reflects the interests served by the termination as a private
257. See Richard Cozzola & Lee Shevell, Representing Parents at Disposition
and Permanency Hearings in GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 12, at 209,
212; CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 1 (2021), childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf.
258. See ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 106-107; CHILD WELFARE INFO.
GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 1
(2021), childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf.
259. See, e.g., Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 36 175 A.3d 639, 649
(“In the private adoption setting, the permanency concerns that are typically present
in state-initiated termination proceedings are not at issue. Here, the children are in a
permanent living situation with their mother and stepfather, which, as all the parties
testified, is not going to change regardless of the outcome of the termination and
adoption processes.”).
260. See Blair, supra note 124, at 300–01 (“When families break apart, it is not
uncommon for parents to harbor feelings of pain, bitterness, and anger toward their
former partners . . . For some parents, the opportunity to terminate the parental rights
of their ex-spouse provides the ultimate weapon in the arsenal of matrimonial
warfare.”).
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remedy. In a dependency case, state intervention in the family and a
subsequent TPR petition are triggered by the alleged abuse or neglect
by parents and the corresponding risk of harm to a child. 261 By
contrast, in an adoption case, the petitioners alone choose when to file
for adoption and seek termination. 262 As noted earlier, the
nonconsenting parent in a contested termination proceeding in an
adoption is almost always at a disadvantage because they are being
compared with the members of the petitioning family who have been
caring for the child.263
Clare Huntington critiques American family law for having a
“reactive approach to family well-being,” which she refers to as
“negative family law.”264 She argues that, when the U.S. family law
system addresses problems that arise within a family, it favors a
“dispute resolution” framework. 265 The state does not “nurture strong,
stable, positive relationships to help families avoid conflict, and then,
when conflict does occur, the state fails to resolve family disputes in a
way that would maintain strong, stable, positive relationships.”266 The
private remedy rationales examined below are consistent with the
pattern Huntington describes. The reactive-negative orientation is
evident throughout private termination petitions and proceedings, and
especially in the requirement of termination in adoption. The
scenarios, standards, and rationales confirm her observation: “When
the current legal system is used for family conflicts, it both freezes the
relationship at the moment of breakdown and fuels the conflict with
the adversarial process, doing nothing to help repair relationships.” 267
As discussed above, the availability of termination as a private
remedy is also consistent with trends in the law that shift focus from
the family as a legal entity to the prominence of individual rights.268
Barbara Ann Atwood has observed: “A singular feature of AngloAmerican law that contrasts sharply with the approach of many
American Indian tribes is the characterization of parenthood as a

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 83.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 84.
See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
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rights-based exclusive status.”269 The private remedy rationales fit
right in with this rights-based orientation, which encourages legal
mechanisms, procedures, and standards that are divisive rather than
promoting strong, stable relationships. Termination of parental rights
represents a zero-sum victory: the rights enjoyed by the petitioner are
expanded through the elimination of another person’s rights.270
Among other aspects of TPR as a private remedy that need
examination is the role played by racial, cultural, and socioeconomic
factors in determining whether an individual decides to pursue
termination as a remedy and even whether they have it available to
them as an option. Families in communities of color are less likely to
seek the termination of a family member’s parental rights and more
likely to be satisfied with an informal caregiving agreement. 271 For
such families, extreme and adversarial measures such as termination
may be associated with public CPS agencies as the result of prior
intervention and family separation, which target families of color
inequitably.272 Further, because private termination proceedings and
adoption outside of the public child protection system generally
require the use of an attorney, those without means to retain counsel
may be less aware of the possibility of terminating another’s parental
rights or less likely to pursue it. 273
In addition to examining the rationales at work in private
termination cases, this Part also considers whether, in light of the
potential adverse consequences of a TPR for the child as well as the
parent discussed in Part I.B., 274 there are alternative ways that the
269. ATWOOD, supra note 88, at 134. Tribal courts, for example, take a far more
inclusive view of the role of multiple adults and “the voice of the collective” in a
child’s life and upbringing, and “traditions of kinship care necessarily inform the
decision-making of tribal judges” when making custody determinations, including
those involving claims by non-parents. Id. at 136–39.
270. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 48, at 744–50 (noting distinction between
“individualistic rights” and “relational rights” in family law). GUGGENHEIM, supra
note 20, at 48–49 (“One of the most deeply contentions issues in American family
law is a struggle among adults over who gets to enjoy the bundle of rights parents
possess.”).
271. Smith, supra note 221, at 320–25.
272. See ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 6–10; Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended
Family System in the Black Community, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION
READER 119 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan H. Hollinger eds. 2004); ELISA MINOFF,
ENTANGLED ROOTS: THE ROLE OF RACE IN POLICIES THAT SEPARATE FAMILIES 15–
19 (2018), cssp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/CSSP-Entangled-Roots.pdf.
273. See ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 11, 13.
274. See supra notes 43–58 and accompanying text.
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identified rationales could be served. In particular, it considers
whether there are measures that could support and enhance
relationships or at least reduce conflict, short of a permanent severing
of the legal parent-child relationship. These existing and proposed
alternative measures include de facto parentage, non-exclusive
adoption, minor guardianship, and recognition of degrees of
parenthood, along with measures to prevent the abuse of family law
litigation. Many of the alternative measures discussed below could
serve multiple rationales, while others would address only specific
ones.
A. Severance of a Parent’s Relationship to a Child to Clear the Way
to Add a New Parent Through Adoption
1. The Rationale and Its Origins and Limitations
The most prevalent rationale for a TPR as a private remedy
applies in the context of an adoption: to allow a non-parent, such as an
existing parent’s new spouse or partner, to acquire a legal relationship
to a child. Adoption itself has clear legal benefits for the adopting
parent and the child. It not only provides a caregiver formal legal status
with respect to a child in their care, but it also imposes parental
responsibilities on that caregiver. 275 Most state adoptions laws,
however, are based on a “one in, one out” model, meaning that, to
achieve these benefits, it is necessary to terminate the rights of one or
both of the child’s existing parents. 276 To add a parent through an
adoption, one must “subtract” a parent in the process. 277 And, with the
other parent out of the picture legally, the parent and new partner gain
a further benefit in exclusive authority over the child. Since they need
not confer with or involve the terminated parent, they can effectively
remove that person from the child’s life.
The Supreme Court of Arizona describes the many benefits to a
child and the adopting family from stepparent adoption in a 2016
275. See Introduction, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 1, 1
(Naomi R. Cahn & Joan H. Hollinger eds. 2004).
276. See, e.g., Savage v. Gomez (In re Adoption of Kassandra B.), 540 N.W.2d
554, 558 (Neb. 1995) (observing that “termination of [a biological parent’s] parental
rights is the foundation of our adoption statutes.”).
277. Some parents may attempt to adopt their own child, without adding a new
parent, for the sole purpose of seeking termination of the other parent’s rights
through the adoption. Courts are wary of permitting this use of adoption. See, e.g.,
In re Adoption by Tamra M., 2021 ME 29, ¶ 8, 251 A.3d 311, 313; In re Adoption
of Xavier K., 268 P.3d 274, 276 (Alaska 2012).
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opinion, Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., which affirmed a lower court’s
termination of the parental rights of a non-consenting father.278 The
petitioning stepfather had “a closing and loving relationship” with the
child, D.L., for about six years, treating the child as his son.279 While
reviewing the application of the “best interest” standard in that case,
the court noted the benefits an adoptee reaps from the adoption:
Adoption obligates the adopting parent legally and financially
to the child. . . . Adoption also solidifies the adopting parent’s
right to exercise custody and control of the child in the future,
serving to advance the child’s wellbeing. . . . An adopted child
also stands to inherit from the legal, adopting parent, without
losing his or her rights to inherit from the other natural parent
whose rights are severed. 280
The court then described the benefits to the child, D.L.,
specifically:
[M]aking D.L. adoptable would affirmatively improve his life
in that it would add permanency and stability to the de-facto
father-son relationship that Stepfather and D.L. already
have. . . . Stepfather is married to Mother, has financially
provided for D.L. for about half of D.L.’s life, and fulfills the
psychological role of a parent. . . . [A]doption would formalize
Stepfather’s obligations to D.L. If Mother becomes
incapacitated or dies, Stepfather would be legally and
financially responsible for D.L., whose continued custody with
Stepfather would be assured. 281
Finally, the court noted that terminating the father’s rights would
“avoid possible negative and psychologically harmful interactions
with D.L., who has expressed fear of both Father and Father’s family
members.”282
None of these potential benefits to the child, however, require that
the existing father’s legal relationship to the child be terminated to
278. 365 P.3d 353, 358 (Ariz. 2016).
279. Id. at 354.
280. Id. at 357 (first citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-117(A) (West 2021); then
citing In re Appeal in Pima Cnty., 674 P.2d 845, 847 (Ariz. 1983); then citing ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-120(6), (12), -2103(1), -2114(B); and then citing
Champagne v. Ryan (In re Estate of Ryan), 928 P.2d 735, 738 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1996)).
281. Id. at 357–58.
282. Id. at 358 (citing In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS500274, 804 P.2d 730, 737 (Ariz. 1990)).
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achieve these results. The improvements of the child’s relationship to
the adopting stepfather are a benefit of the adoption, not of the
termination. The only reason those benefits are linked to the
termination of the father’s parental rights is that state law predicates
an adoption on termination if the existing parent does not consent.283
If such predicate were removed, the added benefits to a child of legal
adoption by a caretaker stepparent could be obtained without any need
to terminate the existing parent’s rights. The final benefit to the child
described by the Arizona court—avoiding harm from interactions with
the father—is a basis for a court to restrict contact between the father
and child.284 Such restriction of contact between a parent and child is
already within the authority of the court outside of the termination
context, as in a custody order between separated parents.285
A serious result of tying termination of a non-consenting parent’s
rights to an adoption petition is that the merits of the underlying
adoption petition, especially the child’s benefit from the adoption, can
easily influence the determination of whether the parent’s rights
should be terminated.286 Essentially, that determination becomes a
choice between who would be the “better” parent—old versus new—
particularly when applying the “best interest of the child” standard, as
noted in Part III.D.287 Even where statutes appear to require courts to
separate the questions, most courts consider the qualities of the
proposed new parent when determining if termination is in the child’s
best interest.288 This also means that the termination requirement
creates a barrier to a meritorious and beneficial adoption if the TPR
petitioner cannot prove the grounds for termination of the parent’s
rights by clear and convincing evidence, although, in such cases, the
absence of such a determination is wholly separate from whether it

283. See Demetrius L., 365 P.3d at 355–56 (first citing Mary Lou C. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 83 P.3d 43, 50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); then citing Audra T. v.
Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); and then
citing Jose M. v. Eleanor J., 316 P.3d 602, 607 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014)).
284. See id. at 358.
285. The court noted that D.L. and the father had had “virtually no contact for
years,” and it is unclear whether there had been any prior court determinations of
father’s contact rights. See id. at 357.
286. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174, 186 (Ill. 1990)
(reversing lower court’s termination of parent’s rights because court had considered
child’s best interests as part of its determination of parental unfitness).
287. See supra notes 181–189 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text.
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would be in a child’s best interest for the petitioner to obtain parental
rights.289
Indeed, where the TPR determination for an adoption does not
consider the merits of the accompanying adoption petition, it is
possible for the TPR to be granted while the adoption petition for
which it was a predicate is denied, leaving the child without a legal
relationship with either the former parent or the proposed new
parent.290 In the public dependency context, the child would still be in
state custody, and there would still be judicial reviews and a chance
for a new permanency plan, such as the identification of new potential
adoptive parents, a permanency guardianship, or even reinstatement
of a parent’s rights. 291 No such options are available, however, in
private adoption-termination cases.
Courts rarely catalog the potential disadvantages to a child when
a parent’s rights are terminated in the context of an adoption. As noted
above,292 a child’s feelings of connection with the parent are not
necessarily severed by the termination of a parent’s legal rights, 293 and
termination can undermine a child’s need for continuity of

289. See Elizabeth J. Aulik, Stepparent Custody: An Alternative to Stepparent
Adoption, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 604, 612, 615 (1979); see also Jennifer Wriggins,
Parental Rights Termination Jurisprudence: Questioning the Framework, 52 S.C.
L. REV. 241, 262–63 (2000).
290. See Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 10, 175 A.3d 639, 645 (“[T]he
background and qualities of the prospective adoptive parent are essential factors to
consider in deciding whether termination of parental rights leading to adoption by
that individual is in the best interests of the child or children.”). The case law
suggests that a failed adoption after private termination is an exceptionally rare
occurrence, which is not surprising given that the petitioners likely assume they will
prevail on the adoption petition itself when they file.
291. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(3) (West 2021); 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-28(4)(b) (West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1116 (b),
(c) (West 2021). See generally LaShanda Taylor, Resurrecting Parents of Legal
Orphans: Un-Terminating Parental Rights, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 318 (2010)
(recognizing state and individual initiatives when a child becomes a legal orphan).
292. See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
293. See Taylor, supra note 291, at 352 (noting that research has found that the
parent-child bond continues when children are in foster care and after termination of
parental rights); see also Cynthia R. Mabry, The Psychological and Emotional Ties
That Bind Biological and Adoptive Families: Whether Court-Ordered Postadoption
Contact is in an Adopted Child’s Best Interest, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 285, 293–95
(2014); Annette Baran & Reuban Pannor, Perspectives on Open Adoption, in
FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 163, 164, 166 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan
H. Hollinger eds. 2004); HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 84; Cynthia Godsoe,
Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 129–34 (2013).
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relationships not only with a parent294 but also with members of the
extended family related to that parent, such as siblings, grandparents,
aunts, uncles, and others. 295 Also, if the child’s custodial parent and
adopting stepparent divorce, the child may subsequently have limited
connection with the adopting stepparent, thus potentially losing their
connection with two parents over the course of their childhood. 296
The justices’ opinions in a recent Arkansas stepparent adoption
case, Ballard v. Howard, provides a glimpse of the possible mismatch
between the presumed policy goal of a TPR in the adoption context,
that is, to permit an adoption to take place, and its actual impact. 297
Although the petitioners had proven that the non-consenting father had
not provided child support in more than twelve months due to his
incarceration and substance use, and that the stepfather had helped
raise the five-year-old child since the child’s birth, the trial court
declined to grant the adoption and sever the father’s rights.298 The nonconsenting father was sixteen years old at the child’s birth and the
court observed: “As to what is going to happen in the future, I don’t
know, nobody here knows what is going to happen.”299 The court also
noted that the child had a close relationship with his extended family
on his father’s side and that it was not in the child’s interest to sever
that relationship.300 The petitioners’ allegations about the father’s
294. Ainsworth v. Natural Father, 414 So. 2d 417, 423 (Miss. 1982) (Lee, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he forced adoption now being fostered upon the child has
effectively denied his privilege of visitation with his father which is not in the child’s
best interest.”).
295. In re Adoption of A.C.B., 159 Ohio St. 3d 256, 2020-Ohio-629, 150
N.E.3d 82, at ¶ 42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Adoption not only eliminates the
noncustodial parent’s parental rights and responsibilities—including the right to
visitation and to have a say in the child’s education and religious affiliation—but
also severs the child’s legal relationships with the parent, grandparents, and other
blood relatives”) (first citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15 (West 2021); and
then citing State ex. rel. Allen Cnty. Child. Servs. Bd. v. Mercer Cnty. Ct. of
Common Pleas, Prob. Div., 150 Ohio St. 3d 230, 2016-Ohio-7382, 81 N.E.3d 380,
¶ 31); In re Interest of Brandon S.S., 507 N.W.2d 94, 108 (Wis. 1993) (holding that
trial court should have admitted evidence of the potential impact of termination of
father’s rights on child’s relationship with paternal grandparents).
296. In an opinion affirming the denial of a petition to annul a child’s adoption
by the parent’s domestic partner after the relationship ended, the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court observed: “Adoption is a serious and permanent family institution. A
child’s legal parenthood cannot be subjected to the fleeting and transitory whims of
adult relationships.” In re Adoption of J.S.S., 2010 ME 74, ¶ 13, 2 A.3d 281, 284.
297. See Ballard v. Howard, 560 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018).
298. Id. at 801.
299. Id. at 801–02.
300. Id. at 802.
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limited parenting abilities “can be addressed with a lot less drastic
remedy than adoption.”301 In other words, while there was no reason
not to allow the stepfather to adopt the child in his care, the
requirement of termination of the father’s rights led to its denial.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial and
specifically noted that a court can consider the relationship between a
child and a parent’s extended family as part of the “best interest”
analysis in an adoption case as well as the father’s intention to become
more involved in the child’s life after his release from incarceration. 302
To support his dissenting position that the trial court’s best interest
analysis had focused on the wrong facts, Judge Kenneth S. Hixson
emphasized the positive relationship the child had with his
stepfather.303 He pointed to the evidence that the stepfather’s role in
raising the child included “changing his diapers, feeding him, teaching
him to ride a bicycle, and taking him fishing,” and that the stepfather
is “for all intents and purposes, the only father the child knows.”304
The child’s father, by contrast, was “a nonfactor—in fact, a negative
factor” in the child’s life.305
Supreme Court of Mississippi Justice Dan M. Lee offered another
judicial critique of the rationale for termination in the private adoption
context as part of his dissent in a 1982 opinion reversing the denial of
a petition for a stepparent adoption. 306 Noting the upward trend of
divorces and remarriages, he observed:
When the mother remarries, a third party is injected into the
existing hostilities between the natural parents which often
leads to violence . . . A stepparent is merely an addition to a
family, not a replacement for a child’s natural parent. In many
cases a child will have close ties to its noncustodial parent, and

301. Id.
302. Ballard, 560 S.W.3d at 803–04 (first citing Pippinger v. Benson (In re
Adoption of J.P.), 385 S.W.3d 266, 278 (Ariz. 2011); and then citing Hollis v. Hollis,
468 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015); see In re L.Z., 616 S.W.3d 695, 698
(Ark. Ct. App. 2021) (affirming denial of adoption petition by “dutiful stepparent”
because the steps the father had taken demonstrate the “potential for a positive
father/child relationship”).
303. Ballard, 560 S.W.3d at 805 (Hixson, J., dissenting).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 806.
306. See Ainsworth v. Nat. Father, 414 So. 2d 417, 422 (Miss. 1982) (Lee, J.,
dissenting).
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to deny that child and parent the privilege of companionship
and love will not always be in the child’s best interest.
Adoption laws were passed to provide homes for destitute,
homeless and neglected children. Yet ordinary adoption laws
are still applied to cases such as this one where the custodial
natural parent seeks to terminate the child’s relationship with
its noncustodial natural parent. 307
Other jurists have expressed a similar concern that a parent and
new spouse or partner pursue an adoption primarily to cut out the other
parent. Justice Sharon L. Kennedy of the Supreme Court of Ohio noted
in her dissent from an opinion affirming a TPR in a stepparent
adoption case because the existing father fell behind in child support
payments: “The majority . . . appears blind to the practical realities of
domestic-relations law. Although many people use a stepparent
adoption to bring a blended family together, it may also be misused as
a tool for removing an existing parent from a remarried parent’s
life.”308
The “subtract-a-parent-to-add-a-parent” rationale for termination
of a non-consenting parent’s rights is vulnerable to other criticisms as
well. In many cases, a parent objecting to the adoption is not asking
the court to deny the adoption petition or even to remove the child
from the petitioners’ care. Rather, the parent simply does not want
their own connection to the child to be severed completely and
permanently.309 Because of the winner-take-all orientation of the onein-one-out approach to adoption, however, the only way for the parent
to have a chance at preventing the termination of their rights is to
withhold consent to the adoption itself.
A good example of the reasoning in this critique of the rationale
in the stepparent context is the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s
opinion in In re Brandon D.310 The child’s mother had moved without
providing the father her new address, and her actions limited his
engagement with the child. 311 The father, who lived in Florida,

307. Id. at 423.
308. In re Adoption of A.C.B., 159 Ohio St. 3d 256, 2020-Ohio-629, 150
N.E.3d 82, at ¶ 42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
309. See Mahoney, supra note 86, at 90 (“The noncustodial parent who objects
to a proposed stepparent adoption is seeking to protect his or her own legal
relationship with the child with all of the benefits and obligations for both parent and
child associated with this status.”).
310. See In re Brandon D., 2004 ME 98, ¶ 14, 854 A.2d 228, 232.
311. See id. at ¶ 7, 854 A.2d at 231.
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testified that “he believed his children were in good hands and that he
respected [the mother and stepfather] for the good job that they had
done raising the children.”312 He sought only “to be able to telephone
the children once or twice a month and write to them.”313 Vacating the
probate court’s order, the Supreme Judicial Court held that, rather than
basing its TPR determination on whether terminating the father’s
rights was in the children’s best interests (regarding which there was
“sparse” evidence), the probate court had improperly based it on
maintaining the stability of the children’s then-current living
arrangements.314 The guardian ad litem testified that granting the
adoption would be a good outcome because of the children’s
relationship with the petitioning stepfather, but also commented: “If
there were a way to adopt without terminating, I’d say that would be
wonderful. . . .”315
A related rationale for terminating an existing parent’s rights in
an adoption context is to render the child “adoptable” by clarifying the
various legal relationships among the parties,316 thereby providing
stability and minimizing the potential for future disruption, conflict,
and litigation.317 However, conflict avoidance alone should not be a
sufficient basis to terminate a parent’s rights. A TPR petition can in
fact inject a high-stakes conflict into a situation where the
noncustodial parent may not otherwise object to a stepparent, relative,
or guardian obtaining parental rights, such as in In re Brandon D.318
Given that “the subtract-a-parent-to-add-a-parent” rationale for
termination does not withstand even modest scrutiny, one might
312. Id. ¶ 13, 854 A.2d at 232 n.3.
313. Id.
314. See id. at ¶ 11, 854 A.2d at 231–32.
315. Brandon D., 2004 ME at ¶ 14, 854 A.2d at 32.
316. See Aulik, supra note 289, at 609, 630 (“The presence of a noncustodial
natural parent further complicates the role and rights of the stepparent” and
“Currently, adoption is the only way in which a stepparent can put to rest any conflict
between the stepparent and the noncustodial parent.”).
317. See, e.g., Ballard v. Howard, 560 S.W.3d 800, 804–06 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018)
(Hixson J., dissenting) (emphasizing that adoption by stepparent would provide
“stability” for the child). Mabry, supra note 293, at 293 (noting that some believe
that “having two mothers or two fathers is too confusing” for an adopted child);
Young, supra note 88, at 510, 530–31 (noting that the normative argument for the
“exclusive family” model is that “authority and responsibility are localized, readily
identified, and efficient” and that an “old father” is seen as a “potentially
destabilizing influence” and a “threat to the stability of the new unit”).
318. See Brandon D., 2004 ME at ¶ 13, 854 A.2d at 232 n.3.

SMITH MACRO DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

Termination of Parental Rights as a Private Remedy 1234

wonder why it is so prevalent and entrenched. Legal scholars have
noted and criticized the persistence of family law’s near-inflexible
“rule of two,” which allows recognition of “only two legal parents for
each child.”319 It is likely that this rigid rule is the actual, unstated
rationale linking a TPR requirement to a stepparent’s attempt to obtain
legal recognition as a parent through an adoption. 320 While there are a
few exceptions, as noted herein, “by and large, family law is reluctant
to enlarge the pie of legal parenthood.”321
The rationale requiring a termination of existing parents’ rights
in an adoption also reflects an implicit assumption that the ideal family
unit is what Professor Sacha Coupet has referred to as the conjugal
dyad structure, meaning that a child has only two parents who have
(or at one point, had) a commitment to each other. 322 Thus, an existing
parent’s rights must be displaced to facilitate the creation of a new
dyad through adoption.323 As Lawrence Friedman observes:
“Adoption holds up the model: the traditional, two-parent, loving,
middle-class family, with stability and permanence.” 324 The power of
the traditional model, in adoption proceedings as elsewhere, protects
heterosexual dyads in particular. 325 Thus, courts are wary when
319. HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 87.
320. See id.; see, e.g. In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 263 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (describing adoption termination proceedings as an exercise of state authority
“to terminate the legal relationship of parent and child and establish a new
relationship”).
321. HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 87.
322. See, e.g. Coupet, supra note 16, at 618–24 (describing family law’s “‘rule
of two,’ the operative rule constraining parental claims to an exclusively dyadic
model” and how the marriage-based legal concept of parent “privileges
conjugality”); Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 11, 11 (2008) (“Family law, as part of the larger prevailing culture, has
enshrined the number two. By constructing links among sex, marriage and
procreation and conceptualizing each as a practice for two, family law takes as its
paradigm the couple or pair.”); Lewis, supra note 122, at 333–38; Melanie B. Jacobs,
Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to
Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 309–14 (2007).
323. Mahoney, supra note 86, at 97 (“The all-or-nothing model of adoption . . .
reflects traditional understandings about family boundaries in the law. Stepparent
adoption involves the replacement of one legal parent figure (the noncustodial
parent) with another (the stepparent), thus reflecting the general principle that legal
parenthood, limited to two adults at one time, must be created by biology or
adoption.”).
324. FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 117.
325. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) (upholding state
law marital presumption based in part on reasoning that “California law, like nature
itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood”).
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petitioners seek to use adoption to support another model, such as
when a child’s non-parent relative, such as an aunt or grandfather, and
one parent seek legal recognition of their co-parenting arrangement.326
Over the years, however, due to new reproductive technologies
and expanding recognition of equitable or de facto parentage, the twoparent paradigm in U.S. family law has been eroding.327 Some state
laws, using gender-neutral language, now expressly allow a child to
have more than two legal parents. 328 The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act,
following the trend of some state laws, clarifies the current status of
the paradigm: “The court may adjudicate a child to have more than
two parents under this [act] if the court finds that failure to recognize
more than two parents would be detrimental to the child.” 329 This
recognition of the reality and benefits of a child having more than two
legal parents undermines the “rule of two.” It thereby also undermines
the rationale for the necessity of the termination of one or more
parents’ rights in the adoption context.
2. Alternatives Worth Considering
A child can obtain a legal connection to a caregiver without
adoption, and there are also ways adoption can occur without the
termination of existing parents’ rights. 330 Such alternatives to common
practices are not available in all jurisdictions, and they may not be
326. See, e.g., In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1118 (Pa. 2016)
(holding that maternal grandfather could not petition to adopt minor children while
retaining mother’s parental rights but terminating father’s rights). See generally
Coupet, supra note 16 (discussing how kinship caregivers have increasingly
assumed substantial parental responsibilities but have limited opportunities to carry
the title of legal parent).
327. See Jessica Feinberg, The Boundaries of Multi-Parentage, 75 SMU L. Rev.
307, 329 (2022); Courtney G. Joslin & Douglas NeJaime, Multi-Parent Families,
Real and Imagined, 90 Fordham L. Rev. 2561, 2573–74 (2022); Tiffany L. Palmer,
How Many Parents? Multiparent Families are Increasingly Recognized by Law and
Society, 40 FAM. ADVOC. 36, 36–37 (2018).
328. See Jennifer Peltz, Courts and ‘Tri-Parenting’: A State-By-State Look,
BOSTON.COM (June
18, 2017),
https://www.boston.com/news/nationalnews/2017/06/18/courts-and-tri-parenting-a-state-by-state-look/.
329. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 613(c) (Alternative B) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2017). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1853(2) (West 2021) (“Consistent
with the establishment of parentage under this chapter, a court may determine that a
child has more than 2 parents.”). Similarly, California enacted a provision to clarify
that a court may find that a child has more than two parents, although the Legislative
Findings suggested this would be true only in “rare” cases. CAL. FAM. CODE §
3040(3)(d) (West 2021).
330. See infra notes 336-362 and accompanying text.
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appropriate in all contexts. But Justice Dan M. Lee, in his above-noted
dissent, urged his colleagues to “find alternatives to adoption in cases
such as this one where a natural parent’s relationship with his child is
being severed forever.”331 And acknowledgement of the underlying
add-a-parent rationale of private TPR in adoption enables
policymakers to consider whether this extreme result is always needed
simply to allow an adoption to proceed.
A. De Facto Parentage
Many states recognize, through laws or court opinions, that a
person without a genetic connection to a child but who has “an actual
parent-child relationship and proof that that relationship was formed
with the consent and encouragement of the child’s legal parent” may
be that child’s “de facto” parent, and thereby entitled to parental rights
and responsibilities.332 The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act reflects this
option.333 Standards and terminology for these equitable parentage
doctrines vary among states,334 but, generally, an individual seeking
such status must prove that they “reside[d] with the child for a
significant period of time and . . . formed a bonded and dependent
relationship with the child which is parental in nature.” 335 Some
stepparents can establish legal relationships with the children in their
care via adjudication as a de facto parent.336
331. Ainsworth v. Nat. Father, 414 So. 2d 417, 423 (Miss. 1982) (Lee, J.,
dissenting).
332. Courtney G. Joslin, De Facto Parentage and the Modern Family, 40 FAM.
ADVOC. 31, 32 (2018) [hereinafter De Facto Parentage].
333. See Joslin, supra note 29, at 602.
334. See Feinberg, supra note 327, at 321; De Facto Parentage, supra note 332,
at 32; Myrisha S. Lewis, Biology, Genetics, Nurture, and the Law: The Expansion
of the Legal Definition of Family to Include Three or More Parents, 16 NEV. L.J.
743, 748 (2016) (“There are a number of terms in use for individuals who occupy a
significant parent-like role in a child’s life. These terms include ‘de facto parents,
parents by estoppel, psychological parents, intent-based parenthood, and in loco
parentis status’; these terms have different meanings in different jurisdictions.”)
(quoting Susan Frelich Appleton, Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender,
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1453, 1486–87 (2014)).
335. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (comment) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
336. See De Facto Parentage, supra note 332, at 31, 33; see also, e.g., Libby v.
Estabrook, 2020 ME 71, ¶ 16–19, 234 A.3d 197, 202–203; In re Parentage of J.B.R.,
336 P.3d 648, 652–53 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). See also Aulik, supra note 289, at 606
(advocating for “stepparent custody” for “formal recognition” of stepparent as an
alternative to adoption that would not requirement termination of the other parent’s
rights); 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 100, at § 2.10[3] (noting that legal commentators
advocate for “a new kind of legal status” for “blended” family situations “that would
be more consensual and would reduce the incidence of hostile litigation.”).
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This outcome is the legal equivalent of adoption because the court
adjudicates the person as the legal parent of the child for all purposes,
at least in some states.337 It affects all existing parents’ rights by
“expanding the pie” of parentage with respect to a child, but it does
not involve termination of any parent’s rights.338 A de facto parent
order can be an alternative to the all-or-nothing stakes of termination
of parental rights to achieve a result that would address all parties’
objectives.339 Indeed, for this very reason, a parent who would not
consent to their child’s adoption might consent to an adjunction of the
non-parental caregiver as a de facto parent.340
B. Minor Guardianship
Minor guardianship provides a way to confer parental authority
on a non-parent, but short of a parentage adjudication as in the de facto
parent context.341 Minor guardianship could achieve many of the same
objectives as adoption or de facto adjudication, without terminating

337. See, e.g., Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 34, 90 A.3d 1169, 1183 (“The role
of a de facto parent is no less permanent than that of any other parent; it is a role that
may be surrendered, released, or terminated only in limited circumstances as
approved by a court.”). See Feinberg, supra note 327, at 322–23; De Facto
Parentage, supra note 332, at 33.
338. De Facto Parentage, supra note 332, at 34–35.
339. Although de facto parenthood was not yet a well-defined concept in 1982,
Justice Lee essentially encouraged something along those lines in his dissent.
Ainsworth v. Nat. Father, 414 So. 2d 417, 423 (Miss. 1982) (Lee, J., dissenting)
(“One alternative would be to award the stepparent equal legal custody of the minor
child with the custodial parent, thereby establishing rights of the stepparent while
preserving the natural parent’s relationship with the child.”). Myrisha Lewis has
called for recognition of a new but similar form of parentage—what she has dubbed
“parentage by praxi”—as a better alternative to stepparent adoption “because it
focuses on the legal relationship between a previously-recognized legal parent and
a possible third parent rather than focusing on the parent-child relationship.” Lewis,
supra note 334, at 768.
340. I have supervised several cases in our law school’s clinic in which we
resolved contested adoption-termination actions through an agreed-to de facto
parentage adjudication.
341. Many jurisdictions provide other routes to “third-party custody” by nonparents in addition to minor guardianship. See generally Josh Gupta-Kagan,
Children, Kin, and Court: Designing Third Party Custody Policy to Protect
Children, Third Parties, and Parents, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 43 (2008)
(arguing that states should enact child custody statutes that would permit a broad set
of individuals to seek custody). To keep this discussion brief, I focus on minor
guardianship because it is the most prevalent legal mechanism available for nonparents to seek custody.
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the existing parents’ rights. 342 In some cases, the parents’ rights may
be suspended or subject to the guardian’s authority, but in most
jurisdictions, a parent can hold a co-guardian status with the guardian,
essentially co-parenting through a shared allocation of parental
rights.343 Indeed, prior to the availability of second-parent adoption by
unmarried couples, de facto parentage, and marriage equality, some
same-sex couples used co-guardianship as an option to confer some
parental right on the other parent. 344
C. Non-Exclusive Adoption
As noted above, most adoption statutes do not allow an adoption
to both add a parent and preserve existing parental rights unless the
existing parent is also a co-petitioner. This means an existing parent
must join the petition or have their rights terminated, voluntarily or
involuntarily. Some states, however, rather than requiring termination
of a non-petitioning parent, have enacted adoption statutes that either
allow an existing parents’ rights to continue while the petitioner for
adoption gains status as a parent or provide that a court may recognize
more than two parents through an adoption. 345 Such an outcome would
achieve the same result as a de facto parent adjudication. Ideally, this
“non-exclusive adoption”346 would result from all parties’ consent to
such outcome: the prospective adopting parent would sign a consent
and waiver before the court, allowing the non-petitioning parent to
retain parental rights and responsibilities after the adoption is final. 347
In 2013, California enacted the first non-exclusive adoption
provision to facilitate adoptions by same-sex couples, but the language

342. See Smith, supra note 221, at 301–09.
343. See id. at 349; see also In re Justina S., 579 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2d Dep’t 1992) (child’s mother and stepfather petitioned for co-guardianship).
344. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of I.H., 2003 ME 130, ¶ 18–20, 834 A.2d 922,
927–28 (mother and her female partner petitioned to be appointed co-guardians of
child).
345. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617 (West 2021).
346. See generally Josh Gupta-Kagan, Non-Exclusive Adoption and Child
Welfare, 66(4) A LA. L. REV. 715 (2015) (arguing that child welfare law should
permit the non-exclusive adoption of foster children who cannot reunify with their
parents) [hereinafter Non-Exclusive Adoption] Some refer to this approach as “thirdparent adoption.” Palmer, supra note 327, at 39.
347. See David D Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of
the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 815–19, 822 (1999) (advocating for nonexclusive adoption even over the objection of an existing parent as long as the
petitioner can demonstrate an existing de facto parent-child relationship).
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in the statute has a potentially broader application. 348 Specifically, in
the section addressing “existing parents’ responsibilities toward
child,” the statute provides that the existing parent will not be
“relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility for, the
adopted child, and have no right over the child”—that is, their rights
will not be terminated—if the existing parent and adoption petitioner
execute and file a waiver with the court prior to the finalization of the
adoption.349 Acknowledging the legacy of the “rule of two,” California
simultaneously enacted a provision to clarify that a court may establish
parentage for more than two parents of a child. 350
Non-exclusive adoption results in the child having an additional
parent rather than a “replacement” parent.351 Waivers such as those
allowed under the California law would address the scenario in In re
Brandon D. where a parent would not object to the adoption itself,
only to the severing of their parental status.352 Similar to the de facto
348. See Feinberg, supra note 327, at 331–32; Non-Exclusive Adoption, supra
note 346, at 720.
349. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the existing parent or parents of an
adopted child are, from the time of the adoption, relieved of all parental duties
towards, and all responsibility for, the adopted child, and have no right over
the child.
(b) The termination of the parental duties and responsibilities of the existing
parent or parents under subdivision (a) may be waived if both the existing
parent or parents and the prospective adoptive parent or parents sign a waiver
at any time prior to the finalization of the adoption. The waiver shall be filed
with the court. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617 (West 2021).
350. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(d) (West 2021). However, the Legislative
Findings for such provision suggested this would occur only in “rare” cases. Nevada
modified its adoption statute in 2021 to permit “one or more adults” to adopt a child
and permitting all existing parents to retain their parental rights as long as they were
co-petitioners. NEV. REV. STAT. §127.030(1) (2021) (“Each prospective adopting
adult and each consenting legal parent seeking to retain his or her parental rights
must be a joint petitioner).
351. In addition to California and Nevada, Alaska, Florida, Oregon,
Massachusetts, and Maryland now have adoption laws that permit recognition of
three parents. See Palmer, supra note 327, at 39. These laws are used primary when
a man is a sperm donor for two women and all three wish to have parental rights and
responsibilities. See id.
352. See supra notes 310–315 and accompanying text. There have been
apparently a few, isolated instances of a court permitting an adoption by a parent’s
new partner without terminating the rights of the other parent, but these are
exceptionally rare and do not provide authority for other courts to follow the same
route. See Ian Lovett, Measure Opens Door to Three Parents, or Four, N.Y. TIMES
(July 13, 2012),https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/14/us/a-california-bill-would-
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parentage context, a non-petitioning parent might be more likely to
consent to a stepparent adoption if their parental rights were not at
stake, thus eliminating the need to adjudicate their “unfitness” to
permit the adoption to go forward. 353
Professor Josh Gupta-Kagan has advocated for the use of nonexclusive adoption in dependency cases. 354 He explains:
Non-exclusive adoption would respect the lived reality of
many foster children by legally recognizing all parents in their
lives. Biological parents, even those who cannot reunify with
their children, retain an important role for many foster children
. . . Moreover, creating an additional legal path for foster
children to leave foster care to new permanent families may
help many children and families find legal options that
minimize unnecessary litigation. 355
The potential benefits of allowing legal recognition of all parental
figures and minimizing litigation apply in the private termination
context as well as in the dependency context.
While an outcome similar to non-exclusive adoption can be
achieved in many states through de facto parentage, not every
stepparent meets the statutory definition of de facto parent, and not
every state provides a path to such status. Moreover, even where such
status is reflected in state law, the adjudication process for de facto
parentage can be difficult for unrepresented litigants to pursue. Thus,
wider availability of non-exclusive adoption could extend to more
families a mechanism to add a parent without terminating an existing
parent’s rights.356
More analogous to the dependency scenario described by
Professor Gupta-Kagan, a non-exclusive adoption option may also
make it easier for a long-term legal guardian to adopt the child where
the parent is not seeking to regain custody of the child and would
legalize-third-and-fourth-parent-adoptions.html (reporting on such an outcome in an
Oregon adoption case); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her
Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First
Century, 5 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 201, 243 (2009) (noting instances
of such outcomes in Alaska, Massachusetts, and Washington adoption cases).
353. See Wriggins, supra note 289, at 263–64. I am unaware of any data
confirming my assumption that there would be fewer contested adoptions if nonexclusion adoption were available as an alternative.
354. See Non-Exclusive Adoption, supra note 346, at 716.
355. Id.
356. See also Feinberg, supra note 327, at 331–32, 335–36, 348, 354–56
(discussing the benefits of non-exclusive adoption and advocating for existing
parents’ express consent to non-exclusive adoption arrangements).
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consent to the adoption but also does not want to give up their parental
rights. It could potentially reduce the number of difficult guardianship
termination proceedings by providing guardians a more secure legal
status that reflects their role as a primary caregiver for the child,
without requiring the parents to relinquish their status as parents or
requiring the guardian to prove the parent’s current unfitness.357
Non-exclusive adoption would enable a court to allocate parental
rights and responsibilities—including, as appropriate, co-parenting,
rights of contact, and child support—among the adults who had legal
parent status with respect to the child. 358 Such allocation orders could
be modified the same way as any other parental rights and
responsibilities order, to reflect a substantial change of circumstances
or an agreement of the parties. Of course, as some commentators have
noted, a downside to any multi-parent family is the potential for
having to re-litigate the allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities among the parents if the multiple parties’ spirit of
cooperation wanes in the years after the adoption takes place. 359
B. To Sever the Legal Connection Between the Child’s Parents
1. The Rationale and Its Origins and Limitations
A second rationale for private termination of parental rights
regarding a child is to enable a petitioning custodial parent to sever
their legal connection to the other parent, protecting them from any
risk associated with having to engage with the other parent.
This rationale has little to do with the child’s interest. A standard
child custody order can preclude any contact between the noncustodial
parent and the child, protecting the child from harm while leaving the
legal parent-child relationship intact. 360 Further, a court can allocate
the parental rights of parents such that one parent not only has
exclusive custody of the child but also has the right to make all
357. See Smith, supra note 221, at 336–40.
358. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 19, at 42–52 (discussing potential
allocations of rights and responsibilities among multiple parents).
359. See id. at 39 (“[T]he greater the number of adults holding parental status,
the greater the potential for conflict”); but see Feinberg, supra note 327, at 357–58
(noting that concerns about conflict in multi-parent families as compared with twoparent arrangements may be overstated).
360. Feinberg, supra note 327, at 359–60 (noting that all jurisdictions permit
courts to structure child custody and visitation orders as needed to protect a child
from harm and to serve the child’s best interests).

SMITH MACRO DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

Termination of Parental Rights as a Private Remedy 1242

decisions affecting the child, including decisions about their education
and health care. Where necessary, a custody order can preclude any
form of contact between the noncustodial parent and a child, even the
sending of a birthday card.361
TPR petitions reflect the fact that, even under such restrictive
orders, the relationship with the other parent may nonetheless present
ongoing problems for the custodial parent. The noncustodial parent’s
remaining legal status as a parent means that there is a continuing legal
connection between them, even if they have divorced or obtained
another formal termination of their relationship. Matters involving
children are a rare exception to the legal principle of finality in
litigation.362 So long as a person remains a legal parent, they have
standing to seek a modification of a court order either to expand their
rights or to assert themselves as the child’s parent in contexts in which
such role is relevant. 363 There are legal standards to meet—such as
demonstrating a “substantial change in circumstances”364—but those
rarely prevent a noncustodial parent from initiating post-judgment
proceedings to restore or expand their parent-child contact rights.365
The filing of such proceedings alone, even if the other parent is
unsuccessful, can be disruptive and anxiety-provoking for the
custodial parent.366
361. ELROD, supra note 51, at § 6:15 (“If visitation [by the noncustodial parent]
would be inimical to the child’s welfare, it can be denied.”).
362. Id. at § 17:01 (“A tension exists between protecting the welfare of a child
and providing a finality to decisions . . . The doctrine of res judicata . . . is limited in
child custody actions because of the court’s inherent parens patriae power.”).
363. Id. at § 17:01 (“In all states, [because of the parens patriae doctrine, judges
retain the power to modify a custody award] to protect and further the best interests
of a child.”).
364. Id. at § 17:04 (“To further the goal of finality to the litigation, the motion
for modification of custody or visitation must allege that a material change of
circumstances has occurred since the entry of the original custody and visitation
order which makes modification in the child’s best interests.”); Yitshak Cohen,
Issues Subject to Modification in Family Law: A New Model, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 313,
315 (2014); HARALAMBIE, supra note 100, at § 7:4 (“Most states required a showing
of changed circumstances prior to modifying a custody order.”).
365. See Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody
Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 760 (1985) (criticizing “marked trend toward making
custody modifications fairly easy to obtain”).
366. See, e.g., Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and
Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42
FAM. L.Q. 381, 388 (2008); Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect
Children in High Conflict Custody Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 495, 499
(2001); Richard Wolman & Keith Taylor, Psychological Effects of Custody Disputes
on Children, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 399, 410–412 (1991).
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A noncustodial parent can have an emotional interest in
maintaining a legal connection to the child or the custodial parent that
has nothing to do with the child. They can use their standing to
perpetuate litigation—even if futile—to harass their former partner or
simply to be able to have an encounter with them in a courtroom. 367
While the specter of litigation with a former spouse or partner can be
unsettling for anyone, avoiding this possibility is particularly desirable
where the noncustodial parent has engaged in extreme violence
towards the custodial parent. 368
This rationale is especially prominent when the child was
conceived as a result of a sexual assault. Research findings suggest
that as many as 32,000 rape-related pregnancies occur each year.369
Allowing a rapist to pursue visitation rights may cause retraumatization of the survivor-parent, sometimes referred to as a
“second rape.”370 Termination of the perpetrator’s parental rights not
only ensures that there is no relationship between the perpetrator and
the child but also that they have no legal connection with the child’s
mother; absent termination, the continued “tether” perpetuates the
assault.371 As National Conference of State Legislators observed:
“Rape that results in a child is one of the only violent crimes that
legally binds victims to their attackers, through the consequences of
that violent act.” 372 For this reason, most states permit termination of

367. See Judith Lewis, supra note 122, at 331 n.99; ELROD, supra note 51, at §
17:1 (“Custody disputes provide opportunities for control over a former partner.”).
368. See supra notes 156–157 accompanying text.
369. See Melisa Holmes, et al., Rape-Related Pregnancy: Estimates and
Descriptive Characteristics From a National Sample of Women, 175 AM. J. OBSTET.
GYNECOL. 320, 322 (1996) (more than 32,000 pregnancies per year); Felicia H.
Stewart & James Trussell, Prevention of Pregnancy Resulting from Rape: A
Neglected Preventive Health Measure, 19 AM. J. PREV. MED. 228, 228 (2000)
(approximately 25,000 pregnancies each year). See also Understanding Pregnancy
Resulting from Rape in the United States, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (June 1,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/sexualviolence/understandingRRP-inUS.html.
370. See Moriah Silver, The Second Rape: Legal Options for Rape Survivors to
Terminate Parental Rights, 48 FAM. L.Q. 515, 516 (2014).
371. See id. at 522.
372. Parental Rights and Sexual Assault, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Mar.
9,
2020)
https://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices/parental-rights-and-sexual-assault.aspx.
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parental rights when the child was conceived as a result of a sexual
assault.373
While some laws provide that sexual assault is a ground for
termination of parental rights specifically in adoption374 or public
dependency proceedings,375 most establish TPR as a stand-alone
private remedy to be sought by the survivor-parent of the child. 376
Many termination laws involving sexual assault as a rationale were
enacted by states in response to a federal law that establishes financial
incentives for states to enact laws allowing private TPR in this
context.377 Colorado’s statute includes these legislative findings,
which make plain its private remedy rationale:
The general assembly hereby declares that the purpose of this
statute is to protect the victim of a sexual assault and to protect
the child conceived as a result of that sexual assault by creating
a process to seek termination of the parental rights of the
perpetrator of the sexual assault . . . The general assembly
further declares that this section creates civil remedies and is
not created to punish the perpetrator but rather to protect the
interests of the child and the victim of a sexual assault.378
Here too, however, a restrictive custody order could protect the
child from the perpetrator. The important impact of these laws is the
relief they provide to the child’s custodial parent, the victim of the
373. See id. Nearly all states and the District of Columbia have enacted some
form of law that specifically addresses the parental rights of perpetrators. Thirty-two
states have laws that allow termination for perpetrators and twenty allow a restriction
on parental rights short of complete termination. Id.
374. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(c)(1) (2021).
375. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-112 (2021).
376. See, e.g., id.
377. See 34 U.S.C. §§ 21301–08 (2018). The 2015 Rape Survivor Child
Custody Act, part of the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, expanded grant
funding available to states under the Violence Against Women Act who enact laws
that enable parents of children conceived through sexual assault to seek termination
of parental rights of the perpetrator. See id. The Department of Justice Office of
Violence Against Women explained in a press release: “To qualify, the state must
have a law that allows the mother of a child conceived through rape to seek courtordered termination of the parental rights of the rapist with regard to that child,
which the court is authorized to grant upon clear and convincing evidence of rape.”
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FUNDS AWARDED UNDER THE RAPE SURVIVOR CHILD
CUSTODY ACT (2016), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/1005396/download.
378. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.5 (2021) (emphasis added). Arkansas’s law,
by contrast, is more explicit a form of punishment against the perpetrator in that it
provides that the parent’s rights are automatically terminated upon their conviction.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-121 (West 2021). The other parent may petition the
court to reinstate the perpetrator’s rights. Id. § 9-10-121(b).
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sexual assault, by severing their relationship to the offending
parent.379 In fact, Maine’s statute goes so far as to provide that if a
court finds that the child was conceived from a sexual assault, the court
must terminate the offending parent’s rights; no consideration may be
given to the child’s best interest. 380
2. Alternatives Worth Considering
In the case of a TPR petition where a child was conceived from a
sexual assault, and in contrast to the add-a-parent rationale, there are
far fewer alternative routes to protect one parent from harm caused by
the other parent having an ongoing legal connection to them through
their mutual status as parents of a child. There is, however, an arguable
distinction between two possible scenarios: in one, the child was the
result of a consensual conception, but their parents’ relationship was
marked by domestic violence and harassment; in the other, the child’s
conception resulting from a sexual assault. In the former case, because
the conception itself was consensual, the interests of the petitioning
parent in the termination are diminished even though the relationship
was or became abusive.381 It is only in the latter instance that the
perpetrator’s retaining status as a legal parent would perpetuate an
assault and, therefore, only in that instance that there is no alternative
private remedy equivalent to the termination of parental rights.
As noted above, a court can allocate all parental rights and
responsibilities other than child support to one parent, thereby
eliminating any co-parenting obligations and minimizing any need for

379. In a recent opinion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the parent
in that case, who was seeking termination of other parent’s rights due to conception
from sexual assault, was not required to petition for adoption to achieve such
outcome. In re Interest of Z.E., No. 3577 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711, at *8 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019). The court noted that the petitioner was not attempting to
establish a new parent-child relationship or punish the father for being a negligent
parent. Id. at *7. “Rather,” the court observed, “Mother is looking to sever Father’s
parental rights to Children as a result of his criminal and sexually predatory behavior
perpetrated against Mother for over 20 years, in an effort to put an end to a cycle of
abuse, and to provide Children with a chance to grow up in a loving, supportive and
caring home with no fear of reprisal from Father.” Id. at *7.
380. See ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1658(3-A)(A) (2021).
381. See Judith Lewis, supra note 122, at 364–66 (discussing similarities and
distinction in use of termination of a perpetrator’s parental rights as a remedy for
those who have experienced interpersonal violence generally, including sexual
assault).
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the parents to have any interactions related to the child.382 The risk of
serial and harassing litigation can also be limited by a court order
addressing the same based on a finding of an abuse of process.383 Such
an order could, for example, require an initial screening by the court
before the custodial parent is served and obligated to respond to or
participate in the proceedings. 384 Restrictions of this kind should be
used sparingly, however, and not operate to limit a parent’s access to
the courts.385
Additionally, some scholars, challenging the current all-ornothing view of legal parentage, have suggested that there could be
degrees of parenthood such that not all legal parents would have equal
rights.386 While many state laws are predicated on the assumption that
children should have frequent and continuing contact with both
parents unless there is a reason not to, based on the child’s best
interest, at least one scholar has pointed out that this policy goal is not
always the best starting point in determining the appropriate level of
parental involvement.387
What can be emphasized here, is that few state laws reflect any
of the proposed approaches to addressing the problems relating to a
legal connection between the parents of a child, short of a termination
of the parental rights of one of them.

382. See id. at 376–77.
383. See 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 80 (2020).
384. See id. (“Injunction restricting frivolous litigation”).
385. See, e.g., Nolette v. O’Neil, 679 A.2d 1084, 1086 (Me. 1996) (holding that
trial court exceeded its authority in limiting a party from filing post-judgment
motions in a divorce matter for a period of three years absent a “detailed showing of
a pattern of abusive and frivolous litigation”).
386. HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 191 (arguing for “new social norms” are
unmarried fatherhood, which will “better reflect [their] abilities and contributions.”);
Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 48, at 797 (advocating for “clearly defined and
hierarchical categories of parenting and care relationships”); Jacobs, supra note 322,
at 332–35 (advocating for legal reforms that recognize “multiple parenthood” with
greater rights for parents who contribute more to caretaking role); Carbone & Cahn,
supra note 19, at 46–52; Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J. L.
& FAM. STUD. 231, 246–50 (2007) (discussing various “models of multiple
parenthood); Young, supra note 88, at 54–55 (advocating a model of parenting that
recognizes both a “core” parent-child unit and a “potential network of persons who
may play supplementary and complimentary roles”).
387. HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 171 (“[T]he central point is that the state
should concern itself with more nurturing strong, stable, positive relationships than
with any one particular structure of child and adult relationships.”).
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C. To Foreclose Any Future Exercise of Parental Rights
1. The Rationale and Its Origins and Limitations
The third private remedy rationale I examine in this Part is
termination as a preventive measure to foreclose any possible future
exercise of a person’s parental rights. This rationale applies when a
petitioning parent or guardian seeks termination of a parent’s rights
primarily as a hedge against significantly changing circumstances.
Thus, a legal guardian may want to block the parent from trying to end
the guardianship, thereby ensuring the perpetuation of the current
custodial arrangement. Alternatively, a parent or guardian may be
concerned that, if they were to die or otherwise be unable to care for
the child, the other parent would, undesirably, step in to assert their
parental status and take custody of the child.
This rationale bears a superficial resemblance to the permanency
rationale of termination in the dependency context. In the child
protection realm, “permanency” specifically refers to a resolution of
the legal matter and to the involvement of the state in the child’s life. 388
The child is in limbo—and the ongoing responsibility of the state—
when it is uncertain whether the child will be reunified with one or
both parents, or cared for in a different setting or family, such as
through adoption, permanency guardianship, or some other
arrangement.389
In the private termination context, however, a goal of
“permanency” addresses a different kind of objective. When a parent
or guardian is bringing a TPR action, they aim to obtain exclusive
parental authority, thereby ensuring that, even if circumstances
change, the other parent will never be in a position to exercise parental
rights, either by seeking a modification of an existing custody or
guardianship order or by asserting their parental status in some other
context.

388. Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New Permanency, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL’Y 1, 2 (2015) (“Permanency is a pillar of child welfare law . . .”); Mark F. Testa,
The Quality of Permanence - Lasting or Binding? Subsidized Guardianship and
Kinship Foster Care as Alternatives to Adoption, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 499,
501 (2005).
389. Such arrangements could include third-party custody or emancipation. In
some instances, children remain in foster care or state care of some kind after the
termination of the parents’ rights. See ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 112; see Garrison,
supra note 48, at 426–55.
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Where there is a minor guardianship appointment for a child, its
perpetuation is contingent on the continuing need for a guardianship
or, where the parent is alive with intact parental rights, that parent’s
ongoing consent. If a parent demands the return of the child and the
guardian does not agree, the parent can petition the court to terminate
the guardianship, requiring the parties to litigate the question of the
parent’s current parental fitness.390 The United States Supreme Court
held in Troxel v. Granville that a “fit” parent is presumed to act in their
children’s best interests,391 and that a court order cannot preclude them
from re-assuming a parental role. 392 Unless the guardian proves the
continued unfitness of the parent, the court must end the guardianship,
even if it has been in place for some time.393 A legal guardian’s
adoption of the child, however, and the resulting termination of the
parent’s rights, prevents a parent from later claiming to have addressed
the underlying difficulties that led to the guardian’s appointment—
e.g., substance use, incarceration, youth—and from petitioning to end
the guardianship.394 Therefore, where termination of a parent’s rights
in the context of an adoption petition is brought by the child’s
guardian, it is not for the purpose of providing legal authority to a nonparent caregiver, because the guardian, as such, already has such
status. Rather, its purpose is to ensure that the guardian’s legal status
with respect to the child cannot be ended through an action on the part
of the parent.395
Another concern that may lead to a private termination petition
by a legal guardian or a custodial parent is the potential death of the
petitioner while the child is still a minor. 396 In all U.S. jurisdictions,
the death of one parent results in the automatic “devolution” of all
parental rights to the surviving parent, regardless of the role they have
played in a child’s life, so long as their rights were not previously
390. See Garrison, supra note 48, at 474–76.
391. 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
392. See id. at 68–69.
393. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Reena D., 35 A.3d 509, 514–15 (N.H.
2011) (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69).
394. Smith, supra note 221, at 335–37.
395. See, e.g., Sidman v. Sidman, 249 P.3d 775, 787 (Colo. 2011); Boddie v.
Daniels, 702 S.E.2d 172, 175–76 (Ga. 2010).
396. Few court opinions expressly address this reason for seeking termination.
See, e.g., In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 804 P.2d 730,
732, 736 (Ariz. 1990) (noting that, at trial, the mother “explained that she sought to
terminate [the father’s] parental rights so she could name her parents in her will as
guardians for [the child].”).
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terminated by a court. 397 A leading treatise on child custody law
describes the implications of the devolution of parental rights as
follows:
Where one parent survives, even if that parent was a
noncustodial parent, the surviving parent is entitled to custody
by operation of law. This is true even if the parents were never
married, so long as parentage has been or can be established.
The best interests of the child generally are not sufficient to
deprive a fit surviving parent of custody by operation of law.
The deceased parent’s testamentary nomination is ineffective
to deprive the surviving parent of custody, without a showing
that the parent is unfit, has abandoned the child, or that there
are similar extraordinary circumstances present. A third party
who wishes to contest parental custody must initiate a custody
proceeding.398
After the death of a custodial parent, any existing court-ordered
allocation of rights between the parents, such as through a divorce or
parental rights and responsibilities judgment, is no longer of any
effect.399 Moreover, there are then no legal limitations on a
noncustodial parent’s access to the child or decision-making authority
regarding the child.400 A guardianship appointment terminates upon
the death of the guardian. 401 In theory, these provisions mean that a
parent who has not exercised or had such rights would, solely as a
result of the other parent’s or guardian’s death (if there is no other
parent), thereupon have complete parental authority. This springing
authority would include the right to demand that the child come live
with that parent, regardless of where they are located and what prior
relationship they had (or did not have) with the child. 402 These implied
397. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 100, at § 10:14.
398. Id.; see, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1502 (2021) (“If one of the parents of
a minor child is dead or has abandoned the child, all parental rights respecting the
child devolve upon the other parent”); Croxford v. Roberts, 509 A.2d 662, 663 (Me.
1986) (applying the same). See also Lynne Marie Kohm, Can a Dead Hand from
the Grave Protect the Kids from Darling Daddy or Mommie Dearest? 31
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 48, 49–50 (2017).
399. See Kohm, supra note 398, at 51–52.
400. See, e.g., Stanley v. Penley, 46 A.2d 710, 712 (Me. 1946); see also Jay
Frederick Wilks, Right of Surviving Divorced Parent to Custody of Children, 19
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123, 125 (1962).
401. See, e.g., UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER
PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 112(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
402. See Spires v. Bittick, 321 S.E.2d 407, 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
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possible outcomes, however, are not inevitable, as discussed below
with “alternatives.”403
The termination of a parent’s rights to prevent the possibility of
devolution in the future provides no present-day benefit to the child.404
Rather, it serves the hypothesis of what the child’s future best interest
would be if their custodial parent dies. It assumes that, based on
present-day evidence, the child would forever definitely be better off
as a legal orphan than ever potentially living with the surviving
parent.405 For that assumption to be appropriate, a court would have to
find that the evidence of the noncustodial parent’s past and presentday conduct presents a clear indication that they could never safely
parent the child and that there is no possibility of rehabilitation. But
evidence of conduct is not always clear or clearly predictive, and
appropriate assumptions about future circumstances are not always
easy to make.
In the short term, the true beneficiary of a termination order based
on avoidance of devolution is the custodial parent or guardian; it
provides them with peace of mind that the child will never end up in
the custody of a parent determined to be unfit. In the longer term, the
termination could also benefit the child if the custodial parent or
guardian does die. But, under those circumstances, it would more
likely benefit a stepparent or other relative who wants to assume care
and obtain legal custody of the child without regard to or interference
from the noncustodial parent.
A parent’s estrangement from a child, for whatever reason,
creates an uncertainty about their role if circumstances arise that
implicate the legal status of their relationship to the child.406 Holding
the “parent card” could give a parent a particular power or benefit that
could be exploited in ways that the other parent or a guardian would
want to prevent. The specter of a latent, inequitable, and possibly
harmful exercise of an estranged parent’s springing parental authority
could be a reason to seek the termination of their parental rights. 407 For
example, an estranged parent could be entitled to inherit from a child
403. See infra notes 410, 412–436 and accompanying text.
404. In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 804 P.2d 730,
736 (Ariz. 1990) (“[The mother’s] wish to make a testamentary nomination of her
parents to serve as guardians of [the child] in the event of her own untimely death
similarly fails to show any present benefit to [the child].”).
405. See id. at 735.
406. See, e.g., id. at 737.
407. See Brown, supra note 46, at 556–57.
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if the child were to predecease that parent. 408 This is an uncommon
scenario, of course, but it can be significant if the child has substantial
assets or there is a claim of wrongful death. Under such circumstances,
the parent who had cared for the child would need to share the assets
or outcome of the claim with the estranged parent, a legal requirement
that could seem grossly inequitable. Because kinship relationships can
have implications for a lifetime and their legal status can become
significant in innumerable contexts, it is understandable that parents
or guardians may wish to guard against confusion or results that are
absurd or unjust. Termination of a parent’s rights is insurance with
broad coverage against all such scenarios. This rationale for TPR is
understandable, but there may also be less legally drastic alternatives.
D. Alternatives Worth Considering
1. Restrictive Custody Orders
As noted above, most of the immediate concerns about a
noncustodial or estranged parent asserting their parental authority in
the future can be mitigated or addressed by courts through a restrictive
order, such as one that allocates all decision-making authority to the
custodial parent.409 Such orders, while no longer in effect after a child
attains adulthood or if a custodial parent dies before the child attains
adulthood, could still serve as determinative evidence against a person

408. Id. at 557 (“The right to inherit and the portion of the decedent’s estate to
be inherited are determined solely by mechanical application of the intestate
succession statutes and not by any assessment of the worthiness of the various
potential heirs.”).
409. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 245 Ill. App. 3d 545, 185 Ill. Dec. 617,
614 N.E.2d 1302 (3d Dist. 1993) (affirming termination of joint custody
arrangement where trial court found that arrangement seriously endangered the
physical, mental, moral and emotional health of the children” due to one parent’s
conduct); Wood v. DeHahn, 571 N.W.2d 186, 189 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that
“it is the court’s responsibility to determine if the noncustodian’s actions are
inconsistent such that it is necessary and reasonable to fashion a restrictive order to
protect the legal custodian’s major life choice”). See generally ELROD, supra note
51, at § 6:15 Nonresidential Parent’s Right to Parenting Time (noting that parent’s
access to a child may be severely restricted based on a risk of harm to the child from
the parent’s “physical violence, abuse (physical, sexual, or emotional), threats of
abduction, sexual misconduct, sexual orientation, religious differences of the
parents, mental illness, and substance abuse”).
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who seeks to exercise their parental status in a way that may be unjust
or inappropriate.410
2. Limiting the Effects of Devolution Through Minor
Guardianship
The potential for devolution of parental rights when the surviving
noncustodial parent has abandoned or caused harm to the child is an
understandable source of worry for a custodial parent. It is possible for
a long-absent surviving parent to demand that their child be delivered
to their care; and a child might need to relocate to a distant place to be
reunited with a surviving parent with whom they may have had little
or no previous relationship. 411 A child’s remaining non-parent
relatives or caretakers, however, are not without tools and options to
prevent a risk of harm to the child from the devolution of parental
rights.
If, after the death of the custodial parent, the child is in the
informal care of a non-parent who wishes to retain custody, that
caregiver can petition to be appointed as the child’s legal guardian,
generally in a probate proceeding. 412 The guardianship appointment
would limit the surviving parent’s authority over the child without
resulting in or requiring the termination of their parental rights. 413 For
example, a stepparent who had raised the child with the deceased
parent but has no formal legal relationship with the child could seek
such an appointment or, alternatively, de facto parent status.
In fact, most of the reported court opinions discussing devolution
arise in the context of contested guardianship, third-party custody, or
adoption matters: that is, where a non-parent—most commonly a
stepparent414 or a relative of the deceased custodial parent—petitions
410. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Donovan C., 2019 ME 118, ¶ 14–15, 212
A.3d 851, 844–55; IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-3-6 (West 2021) (requiring separate
proceeding for surviving parent to take custody of a child if “the parent was not
granted custody of the minor in a dissolution of marriage decree” and such decree
required supervised visitation or suspended “parenting time” entirely).
411. See, e.g., Spires v. Bittick, 321 S.E.2d 407, 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)
(explaining that a father who had a “lapse in contact with his son” could get custody
of his son after the mother’s death and “make arrangements to pick up [his son]”).
412. HARALAMBIE, supra note 100, at § 10:14. See, e.g., Donovan C., 2019 ME
at ¶ 4, 212 A.3d at 853.
413. See Smith, supra note 221, at 286.
414. See Stephen Hellman, Stepparent Custody Upon the Death of the Custodial
Parent, 14 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 23, 26–28 (2000); see also, e.g., Spires, 321 S.E.2d
at 410 (denying stepparent’s petition to adopt child where surviving parent did not
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to be appointed as guardian of the child, or to take custody, or to adopt
them,415 and the noncustodial surviving parent objects and seeks
custody.416
A guardianship or other third-party custody litigation strategy is
not certain to succeed in preventing the surviving parent from
assuming custody. Indeed, in light of the superior and constitutionally
protected rights of the parent, a guardianship petition would not be
granted without a parent’s consent or a court finding of unfitness or a
similar standard in light of the Troxel presumption.417 Many state
courts have long recognized “[t]he natural right of a parent to the care
and control of a child” even aside from the constitutional
considerations that have been the focus of recent case law. 418
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, a factual record sufficient to
support the termination of a parent’s rights would almost certainly
provide a basis for a court to appoint a guardian over a parent’s
objection, given that the former requires a higher standard.419
A few state statutes address disputes between a surviving parent
and a non-parent seeking custody of the child. 420 Such laws do not
limit the actual devolution of rights or established preference for a
consent to the adoption and although his “conduct has not been exemplary in either
the prompt payment of child support nor in the persistence in exercise of his rights
to visitation” it was not a sufficient basis to terminate his parental rights on the basis
of abandonment).
415. See, e.g., HARALAMBIE, supra note 100, at § 10:14 (stating that a Montana
statute will allow “the noncustodial parent; the surviving spouse of the deceased
custodial parent” or “a person nominated by the will of the deceased custodial
parent” to “petition for custody following the death of the custodial parent”); see
also JACOBS, supra note 86, at § 6:8.
416. An estranged parent may choose not to seek custody of the child after the
other parent’s death. If the child is being cared for by a relative or stepparent, the
surviving parent may be content to leave that custodial arrangement in place and
even consent to appointment of the caregiver as the child’s guardian.
417. See supra note 390 and accompanying text. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 69 (2000) (“traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interests
of his or her child.”).
418. See, e.g., Merchant v. Bussell, 27 A.2d 816, 818 (Me. 1942). This is
sometimes referred to as the “parental preference” doctrine. ELROD, supra note 51,
at §§ 1:2, 4:6; JACOBS, supra note 86, at § 6:8; 4 A. KIMBERLEY DAYTON ET AL.,
ADVISING THE ELDERLY CLIENT § 37:12.
419. See, e.g., Donovan C., 212 A.3d at 854–55 (affirming appointment of
guardian over surviving parent’s objection when petitioner proved the parent had
abandoned child, applying definition of abandonment from dependency termination
statute).
420. See infra notes 421–22 and accompanying text.
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child to be raised by a parent. 421 Rather, they recognize that, with
sufficient evidence of the implications for the child’s interest, the
presumption favoring the parent in such contexts could be rebutted by
the non-parent petitioner.422 Maine recently amended its guardianship
law to add a rebuttable presumption to the standard for appointment
over the objection of a surviving parent. 423 The presumption applies
if, at the time of the custodial parent’s death, there was a highly
restrictive court order in effect that had allocated few if any parental
rights to the surviving parent. 424
In short, in assessing the third rationale for a TPR, we should
recognize that there are already legal mechanisms in most state laws
for addressing the care of a child when there is a risk of harm to the
child if the surviving parent asserts their parental rights to custody.
While the rationale is based on avoiding the risks of devolution at the
death of a custodial parent, it is not inevitable that a child will end up
in the care of that estranged parent by operation of law unless the
parent’s rights are terminated before the custodial parent’s death.
Given the existence of such mechanisms along with standard child

421. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-221 (West 2021) (providing that “upon
the death of a parent” certain categories of people can “request a parenting plan
hearing,” including “the natural parent; . . . the surviving spouse of the deceased
parent; [and] a person nominated by the will of the deceased parent”).
422. See, e.g., Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 568 (N.J. 2000) (“[I]n custody
determinations between a fit parent and a third party, as opposed to claims made
between two fit parents, the child’s best interests become a factor only after the
parental termination standard has been met, rather than the determinative standard
itself.”) (applying N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-5 (West 2021)); In re A.R.A., 919 P.2d
388, 392 (Mont. 1996) (holding that statute “does not give the district court authority
to deprive a natural parent of his or her constitutionally protected rights absent a
finding of abuse and neglect or dependency”). See also Dodge v. Dodge, 505 S.E.2d
344, 438 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998); Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986); In
re B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 285–87 (Ind. 2002). Some court opinions appear to do a
straight “best interest” analysis, but those are of questionable constitutionality. See,
e.g., Freeman v. Rushton, 202 S.W.3d 485, 488 (Ark. 2005) (holding that best
interest of the child is “paramount” in custody dispute between fit surviving parent
and grandparents, while dissenting justice raised concerns about the constitutionality
of the majority opinion in light of Troxel).
423. See ME. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 5-204(2) (2021).
424. Id. § 5-204(2)(C)(3) permitting a court to appoint a guardian over the
objection of a surviving parent if “[a] prior court order concerning the minor granted
another parent, who is now deceased, exclusive parental rights and responsibilities
with respect to all aspects of the minor’s welfare without reserving for the parent
who is now the respondent in the guardianship proceeding any rights to make
decisions, to have access to records or to have contact with the minor”).
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protection laws that would enable the state to seek custody,425 courts
should scrutinize the rationale for terminating a parent’s rights for the
purpose of precluding any future exercise after a custodial parent’s
death.
Additionally, a custodial parent could likely strengthen the future
position of a nonparent’s petition for guardianship in the event of that
parent’s death by nominating them as a “standby guardian” in a will
or other written instrument, as is now permitted under the Uniform
Probate Code and several state laws. 426 While such nomination would
not guarantee the appointment since, if the surviving parent objects, a
court would still have to find that parent unfit, 427 it could serve as
evidence of the parents’ respective relationships with the child prior
to the custodial parent’s death. Advance planning of that kind by a
parent anxious to avoid the risks of devolution can provide some peace
of mind without requiring the parent to successfully petition to
terminate another parent’s rights. 428
3. Ordering Post-Guardianship Contact Between the Former

425. If a there is immediate risk of harm to the child or if no adult is willing to
assume care of the child, a state CPS agency could of course seek custody of the
child through a dependency action, but that scenario is likely to be far less common
than a private guardianship action. See, e.g., Webb v. Charles, 125 Ariz. 558, 560,
611 P.2d 562, 563–64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (father sought habeas corpus order for
custody of child who was placed by the state in custody of grandmother after
mother’s death).
426. As one commentator has advised:
Putting a clear estate plan in order is absolutely essential [if a parent does not
want their child’s other parent to assume custody]. A custodial parent should
draft and execute a will naming a preferred guardian for the children, setting
out the special relationship that individual has with the children, and why that
person is most appropriate to act in the best interests of the children. Last will
and testament provisions regarding the care of the children might also include
facts about how the surviving parent is unfit to gain or regain custody.
Kohm, supra note 398, at 57.
427. Id. at 52–53. See also, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 5-203 (2021) (permitting
appointment of nominated guardian over objection of other parent if all other
requirements for appointment are met).
428. A full discussion of estate planning by parents is outside the scope of this
Article, but parents can consider a range of potential tools parents to address the care
of a child after the parent’s death. See generally Richard M. Horwood, Estate
Planning Specifically for the Single Parent, 25 EST. PLAN. 77 (1998) (examining the
estate planning process when a single parent is in the picture); Kohm, supra note
398, at 56–61.
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Guardian and Child
As noted above, a guardian may seek adoption of the child in their
care for the primary purpose of obtaining a termination order to
prevent the parent from attempting to resume custody of the child. In
a high-conflict guardianship termination case, the guardian may be
concerned that a parent resuming care will disallow contact between
the former guardian and the child once the guardianship ends. If the
guardianship appointment was in place for an extended time, there is
a risk that the child will suffer harm or trauma if their contact with a
former guardian and caretaker is severed wholly and abruptly. 429 To
mitigate potential harm to the child by the termination of a
guardianship, states could amend their guardianship statute, as Maine
recently did, to grant courts the limited authority to address just that
risk by ordering the ongoing rights of contact between the former
guardian and the child after the guardianship is terminated. 430
VI. SHOULD WE TERMINATE PRIVATE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS?
This Article has explored how termination of a parent’s rights can
be obtained by individuals as a form of legal remedy to allow an
adoption to proceed, to sever a legal connection between the parents
of a child, and to guard against a parent’s future exercise of their
parental rights. I have argued that the availability of this remedy
through the courts comes at a cost, not only to the parent whose rights
have been terminated but also potentially to the interests of the child.
This practice also undermines family law policy goals and
constitutional principles, both of which place high value on the
429. See Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent?: Revisiting Equitable
Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining
Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 66 (2017) (“If the relationship between
a child and an adult with whom he or she has formed an attachment relationship is
disrupted, it can be very detrimental to the overall well-being of the child. Id. at 65. The
disruption of attachment relationships can cause significant both short- and long-term
psychological and emotional harm to children.”); NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS
NETWORK, CHILDREN WITH TRAUMATIC SEPARATION: INFORMATION FOR
PROFESSIONALS
1–3,
https://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/resources/children_with_traumatic_separation_p
rofessionals.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
430. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 5-211(2) (2021) (“The court terminating a
guardianship may enter an order at the time of the termination or the expiration of a
transitional arrangement. . . providing for communication or contact, including
overnight visitation, between a minor and the former guardian after the termination
of the guardianship”).
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preservation of the parent-child legal relationship, even where a parent
is no longer a caregiver. Further, the availability of private TPR on
grounds of incarceration, substance use, mental illness, failure to pay
child support, and the like through private actions between
individuals, in addition to dependency proceedings, expands the ways
that parents who are already relegated to the margins of society are
vulnerable to the destruction of their legal ties to their children.
As noted in Part III, private terminations of parental rights have
the same consequences as termination orders in public dependency
proceedings but lack many of the procedural protections of
proceedings initiated by a public agency, thus creating inequities and
risking erroneous outcomes. One might conclude that a solution to
these problems would be to change private termination proceedings so
that they more closely resemble dependency actions or even to assign
public CPS agencies a role in all termination proceedings. Because,
however, as many scholars and advocates have observed, the existing
public family regulation system is already excessively oriented around
child removal and termination of parental rights, 431 that is exactly the
wrong direction to pursue if solutions are sought to the various
problems created by private TPRs.
Instead, we should consider whether, when, or the extent to which
termination of a person’s parental rights should be available as a
private remedy at all. As this Article has discussed, there are few
instances in which a petitioner can demonstrate that termination,
rather than some alternative, is the necessary way to achieve the
family’s goals and protect the child’s interests. As the analysis of
rationales indicates, states should permit termination only if the
petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that a
specific affirmative benefit for the child can be provided or that harm
to the child or petitioner can be avoided only from severing the legal
431. In fact, as Marsha Garrison has noted, public family intervention law
should take a cue from private family law’s emphasis on preserving the parent-child
relationship when parents are living apart. Garrison, supra note 48, at 478. For
examples of contemporary family intervention reform advocacy. See, e.g., Vivek
Sankaran & Christopher Church, Rethinking Foster Care: Why Our Current
Approach to Child Welfare Has Failed, 73 SMU L. REV. F. 123, 134 (2020); Vivek
Sankaran et. al., A Cure Worse Than the Disease? The Impact of Removal on
Children and Their Families, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1161, 1185 (2019); Erin Miles
Cloud, Toward the Abolition of the Foster System, 15 SCHOLAR & FEMINIST ONLINE
(2019),
https://sfonline.barnard.edu/unraveling-criminalizing-webs-buildingpolice-free-futures/toward-the-abolition-of-the-foster-system/; Roberts, supra note
12.
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relationship.432 For example, where one parent seeks termination of
another parent’s rights to preclude that parent’s access to the child or
to avoid co-parenting of the child, the petitioning parent should first
demonstrate that a court order already in effect allocating custody and
decision-making fully to that parent is inadequate to protect the child
from harm.433
The no-other-alternative approach would still enable a court to
grant a termination petition brought by one parent against another
based on proof that the child’s conception resulted from a sexual
assault. The rationale for these petitions is centered on ending the
further victimization of the petitioning parent that exists from the
continuing legal connection with the perpetrator. The circumstances
of those proceedings are sufficiently unique that nothing short of
termination of the perpetrator’s rights can serve such rationale.
However, where one parent seeks termination of another parent’s
rights to preclude that parent’s access to the child or to avoid coparenting of the child, the petitioning parent should first demonstrate
that a court order already in effect allocating custody and decisionmaking fully to that parent is inadequate to protect the child from
harm.434
Several state appellate courts have applied components of the
approach for private termination cases I propose here specifically to
ensure that termination is a remedy granted only sparingly. The
Arizona Supreme Court observed: “[T]ermination of parental rights is
not favored and . . . it generally should be considered only as a last
resort.”435 The court noted the limitations of the usual best interest
432. See In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 804 P.2d
730, 733 (Ariz. 1990) (“Several courts have noted that termination of parental rights
is not favored and that it generally should be considered only as a last resort.”). Cf.
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 64, at 17 (discussing alternatives to termination of parental
rights in the dependency context).
433. The Maine Legislature recently enacted such an approach. 2021 Me. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 340 (West), enacting ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1658(2)(C) (2021) (adding as
a ground for termination: “A final order, other than in a protection from abuse matter
under chapter 101, that has been in effect for at least 12 months grants the petitioner
exclusive parental rights and responsibilities with respect to all aspects of the child’s
welfare, with the exception of the right and responsibility for support, without
reserving for the parent any rights to make decisions, to have access to records or to
have contact with the child, and termination of the parent’s parental rights and
responsibilities is necessary to protect the child from serious harm or the threat of
serious harm.”). This language is based on a specific recommendation of the Maine
Family Law Advisory Commission, for which I have served as a consultant.
434. See id. § 1658(3-A)(A).
435. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 804 P.2d at 733.
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analysis in termination cases 436 and that, while a child’s best interest
could be a reason to deny a petition to terminate, it alone is not a
sufficient basis to grant one. 437 Indeed, the court stressed the point,
writing, “A determination of the child’s best interest [in a TPR case]
must include a finding as to how the child would benefit from a
severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship.” 438
Termination based on a finding of abandonment alone, for example,
cannot be assumed to be in a child’s best interest. “Rather,” the court
explained, “petitioner must prove an affirmative benefit to the child
resulting from termination.”439 The court reasoned: “[A] parent, even
an inadequate one, is better than no parent at all unless the child can
somehow benefit from losing his natural parent.” 440
The Alabama Supreme Court has imposed a “no other
alternative” standard in private termination cases as well as in public
dependency matters. 441 Specifically, courts must apply a two-prong
test in a termination petition brought by a custodial parent. 442 The first
436. Id. at 735 (“Petitioner must prove an affirmative benefit to the child
resulting from termination . . . This reasoning reflects an unspoken assumption that
a parent, even an inadequate one, is better than no parent at all unless the child can
somehow benefit from losing his natural parent.”).
437. Id. at 734 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982))
(“[U]ntil the state proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital
interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.”).
438. Id. at 734 (first citing In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS6520, 756 P.2d 335, 343 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); then citing In re Appeal in Pima
Cnty. Juv. Action No. S-111, 543 P.2d 809, 819 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); then citing
In re Adoption of Hyatt, 536 P.2d 1062, 1068 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); then citing In
re Appeal in Cochise Cnty. Juv. Action No. 5666-J, 650 P.2d 459, 463 (Ariz. 1982);
and then citing In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-6831, 748 P.2d
785, 788 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)).
439. Id. at 735 (citing Juv. Action No. JS-6831, 748 P.2d at 788).
440. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 804 P.2d at 735. Several states
have adopted post-adoption contact provisions, also known as “open adoption,”
which apply even in the public dependency context. These recognize that even if a
parent’s rights are terminated, there may be an underlying emotional or
psychological relationship (or the potential for one) that is worth preserving or at
least not undermining. Huntington notes that even after a change in legal status “the
relationship between former family members typically endures.” HUNTINGTON,
supra note 24, at 85. These measures are beyond the scope of this Article but should
be considered as part of a state’s overall termination statutory scheme, whether
public or private. If private termination is limited to extreme cases, as I discuss here,
there will likely be few instances in which continuing contact after termination is
appropriate.
441. Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950, 954 (Ala. 1990).
442. Id.
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prong is the application of the termination standard itself. 443 The
second prong requires the court to “inquire as to whether all viable
alternatives to a termination of parental rights have been
considered.”444 The court reasoned: “Inasmuch as the termination of
parental rights strikes at the very heart of the family unit, a court
should terminate parental rights only in the most egregious of
circumstances.”445
Similarly, a Florida appeals court applied the concept of “least
restrictive means” drawn from the public dependency statute in a
private termination case because the same constitutional interests are
implicated.446 The court explained that constitutional principles
require a petitioner to prove that termination “is the least restrictive
means of protecting the child based on a totality of circumstances” and
also held that “measures short of termination should be utilized if such
measures can permit the safe re-establishment of the parent-child
bond.”447
An implicit but significant assumption present in many private
termination proceedings is that if someone is not up to the role of being
a full-time caregiving parent, they are not worthy of being any kind of
legal parent and their children are better off with no parent than with
a less-than-ideal parent. Such an assumption is evident from routine
comparisons between the petitioner and the parent whose rights are at
stake and also from the application of the often specious and always
nebulous “best interest” standard. Thus, an “affirmative benefit to the
child” inquiry should not consist of comparing the parent whose rights
are at stake with the petitioner.
In adoption cases in particular, these comparisons set up a false
choice for the court. They are based not on children’s interests or the
lived reality of what constitutes a child’s “family” from an emotional

443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 952. Intermediate appellate courts, however, have held that standard
is waived in cases of abandonment. See, e.g., K.S.B. v. M.C.B., 219 So. 3d 650, 655
(Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (“We note, however, that ‘the [father], by abandoning [his]
child, ‘lost any due-process rights that would have required the juvenile court to
explore other alternatives before terminating [his] parental rights.’’”) (citing L.L. v.
J.W., 195 So. 3d 269, 274 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015)).
446. See S.S. v. D.L., 944 So. 2d 553, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (citing B.C.
v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam., 887 So. 2d 1046, 1050 (Fla. 2004).
447. Id. at 558 (first quoting W.R. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 896 So. 2d
911, 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); and then quoting L.B. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam.,
835 So. 2d 1189, 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
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and psychological perspective, but, rather, on a dubious
heteronormative, traditional construct of the family as a conjugal
dyad.448 In common situations where a child’s existing parents are no
longer in a relationship or household with each other but the other
parent is in a relationship with the proposed new adoptive parent and
the objecting parent is not a primary caregiver, the objecting parent is
unlikely to prevail after such comparison.
Further, a court’s analysis of the competing harms and
affirmative benefits to the child from a termination should encompass
not only the child’s legal relationship with the parties to the proceeding
(that is, their parents and a potential adoptive parent) but the potential
impact on the child’s identity and relationship with extended family.
As Professor Dorothy Roberts reminds us: “Children also have an
interest in maintaining a bond with their parents and other family
members.”449
State courts can take a cue here from the approach of many tribal
courts applying Native laws, which “consider the children’s place in
the entire extended family in order to make a judgment.” 450 Where a
child must live with extended family because “biological parents
could not function adequately as parents,” such arrangements have
traditionally been informal, and practices of “informal adoption,” not
requiring termination, are now recognized in tribal codes and
courts.451 Two researchers who studied Native child welfare practices
found that termination of parental rights is exceptionally rare
occurrence in tribal courts, even if the procedure exists on the books

448. See discussion supra at notes 319–326 and accompanying text.
449. ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 108. See In re Interest of Brandon S.S., 507
N.W.2d 94, 107 (Wis. 1993) (evidence of impact of severing child’s relationship
with grandparents was relevant in termination in adoption case).
450. ATWOOD, supra note 88, at 124 (2010) (quoting Goldtooth v. Goldtooth, 3
Navajo Rptr. 223, 226 (Navajo 1982)). The Goldtooth court explained: “[I]n Navajo
culture and tradition children are not just the children of the parents but they are the
children of the clan.” Goldtooth, 3 Navajo Rptr. at 226.
451. ATWOOD, supra note 88, at 145, 147–49. Atwood notes that: “Traditional
[Native] adoption is often linked to the Native concept of collative responsibility for
the welfare of tribal children.” Id. at 149. A Navajo court observed: “The Navajo
Common Law is not concerned with the termination of parental rights or creating
legalistic a parent and child relationship because those concepts are irrelevant in a
system which has obligations to children that extends beyond the parents.” In re
Interest of J.J.S., 4 Navajo Rptr. 192, 195 (Navajo D. Ct. 1983).
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in tribal laws.452 They observed that “many tribes actively abhor the
idea and will not subject their children to this unthinkable act.” 453
Several tribal courts permit a form of non-exclusive adoption, under
which a parent retains some residual rights after an adoption decree is
awarded, rather than requiring a “permanent cancellation” of the
parent-child relationship.454 This is in sharp contrast to the rightsbased, “winner-take-all” approach in most U.S. state courts.455
For a “no other alternative” approach to be meaningful, states
must also take two further indispensable steps in addition to adopting
that standard, in some form, for private termination cases.
First, states must provide genuine, workable alternatives to
termination, such as those described in Part V, so that this drastic
measure is not the only route to addressing the purposes of current
termination statutes. For example, a state must provide routes to
parentage for a caregiver, such as de facto parentage and nonexclusive adoption, that do not include termination of existing parents’
rights as a predicate. Similarly, a guardianship statute can provide
courts with the tools they need to address custody on an expedited
basis when a child’s custodial parent dies. 456 Other than in the context
of a conception from sexual assault or cases where there is a true risk
of harm to the child from the continuation of the legal parent-child
relationship itself, alternatives such as those indicated here can address
the underlying policy rationales for private TPRs and serve the
452. Terry L. Cross & Kathleen Fox, Customary Adoption as a Resource for
American Indian and Alaska Native Children, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 423, 428 (2005).
453. Id.; see also ATWOOD, supra note 88, at 145–47.
454. ATWOOD, supra note 88, at 146–47.
455. In re Interest of J.J.S., 4 Navajo Rptr. at 193 (describing the “American
Law of Adoption” as oriented towards parental “duties” such that “when those duties
are breached, then the law will take the children away from the natural parents and
given them to other parents.”).
456. See, e.g., 2021 Me. Legis Serv. ch. 340 (West), enacting ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-C, § 5-204(2)(C) (2021). This new provision allows a court to appoint
a guardian over a surviving parent’s objection if:
(3) A prior court order concerning the minor granted another parent, who is
now deceased, exclusive parental rights and responsibilities with respect to
all aspects of the minor’s welfare without reserving for the parent who is now
the respondent in the guardianship proceeding any rights to make decisions,
to have access to records or to have contact with the minor and:
(a) Such order was in effect at the time of the death of the parent awarded
exclusive parental rights and responsibilities; and
(b) There is neither a substantial change in circumstances between the
time of the entry of the order and the parent’s death nor other facts that would
render a finding based on the order to be inequitable or unjust. § 5-204(2)(C).
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interests of those involved while also staying true to the principles
limiting state interventions in the family, including in private actions.
Second, state laws must ensure that any court applying the noother-alternative standard follows a set of robust procedural
protections throughout the proceedings.457 The court must ensure that
the parent had opportunities for rehabilitation and reunification and a
sufficient period to demonstrate that they are prepared to fulfill at least
some rights and responsibilities as a parent. To have the effects wanted
here, this opportunity for rehabilitation and reunification must include
appropriate professional assessments and services. The requirement of
such assessments and services suggests a role for public CPS agencies,
but they should be granted that role only as part of a broader
reorientation of the current public “child protection” system away
from family intervention and towards a true child welfare mission.458
The availability of services and supports for children and families
should not be restricted to those who are in the CPS caseload based on
a report of abuse or neglect. There is no reason why providing these
cannot be a part of a CPS general mission rather than solely in
connection with family intervention or dissolution. States should be
able to access federal child welfare funding for this work as well,
consistent with the broader objective of “prevention” services
reflected in more recent federal child welfare laws.459

457. Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 14, 175 A.3d 639, 645–46
(“[A]pplication of the Adoption Act, as written, poses a substantial risk to
fundamental parental rights that the court must respect by rigorous application of
quality of evidence standards and procedural protections . . .”).
458. See Emma Williams, ‘Family Regulation,’ Not ‘Child Welfare’: Abolition
Starts with Changing our Language, THE IMPRINT (July 28, 2020, 11:45 PM),
https://imprintnews.org/opinion/family-regulation-not-child-welfare-abolitionstarts-changing-language/45586; see generally Alan J. Dettlaff, et al., It is not a
Broken System, It is a System That Needs to be Broken: The Upend Movement to
Abolish the Child Welfare System, 14 J. OF PUB. CHILD WELFARE 500 (2020)
(describing the upend movement—a collaborative movement aimed at abolishing
the child welfare system).
459. See Family First Prevention Services Act of 2018, enacted as part of the
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64. The Children’s
Defense Fund has described the new law as follows:
Family First includes long-overdue historic reforms to help keep children
safely with their families and avoid the traumatic experience of entering
foster care, emphasizes the importance of children growing up in families,
and helps ensure children are placed in the least restrictive, most family-like
setting appropriate to their special needs when foster care is needed.
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Expanded availability of services and supports would also
provide courts with useful evidence of the extent to which something
short of termination could address the situation leading to the
petition.460 States could adopt a variation of the Indian Child Welfare
Act requirement, for any severance of parental rights in an Indian
family, of proof that “active efforts have been made to provide
remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the
breakup of the . . . family and that these efforts have proved
unsuccessful”461 It is likely that the availability of these resources and
adoption of these requirements would reduce the number of TPR
petitions filed in dependency matters as well as in private cases.
It is also important, relatedly, that courts and agencies—too often
in a hurry to resolve matters—allow time for such services to have an
effect before concluding that they are futile. 462 We place a premium
on the rapid resolution of disputes in court, and the harsh deadlines in
federal child welfare statutes have only contributed.463 As many
commentators have argued, while the uncertainty and adversarial
aspect of extended litigation can present its own set of problems for
children and families, pushing resolutions too quickly risks outcomes
that reflect the expiration of timelines rather than the needs or potential
benefits of the family.464 For any form of active efforts at reunification
Family First Prevention Services Act, CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND,
https://www.childrensdefense.org/policy/policy-priorities/child-welfare/familyfirst/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
460. See Alyssa W. v. Justin G., 433 P.3d 3, 5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018) (“We
conclude a private party seeking severance on that ground [substance use] must show
that the parent was offered reunification services or that such services would have
been futile”). See also, supra note 203 and accompanying text.
461. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). See S.S. v Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, 574–76 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2017) (applying ICWA “active efforts” requirement in private termination
case between parents); see generally In re Adoption of T.A.W., 383 P.3d 492, 503
(Wash. 2016) (also applying ICWA “active efforts” requirement in private
termination case between parents).
462. Vivek S. Sankaran, Innovation Held Hostage: Has Federal Intervention
Stifled Efforts to Reform the Child Welfare System?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281,
281, 283–84 (2007) (“State courts face pressures to move cases through a busy
docket rather than spend the time needed to make informed decisions about
individual children.”).
463. Id. at 291 (noting how states must adhere to federal timeline or risk loss of
funding for child welfare programs).
464. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 136 (“Existing services often fail at
prevention or reunification because they do not address the needs of families, are
inadequately funded, and do not last long enough.”); JANE WALDEFOGEL, THE
FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION: HOW TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF ABUSE & NEGLECT
82–87 (1998) (describing criticisms of contemporary child protection systems).
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and rehabilitation to be meaningful and effective, it must be
accompanied by patience, flexibility, and compassion.465
Finally, where private termination of parental rights is allowed to
proceed, courts must ensure that all other rigorous procedural
protections are enforced in all related matters, especially the right to
effective assistance of counsel for parents who are the subject of such
petitions. These protections must be clearly set out in statute or rule
and be supported with adequate public funds. Among other
protections, these should include, at a minimum, access to professional
alternative dispute resolution, informed consent for any agreements,
and the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child or children
involved. The interests of parents, children, and families deserve
nothing short of full access to all such measures.
CONCLUSION
My hope is that this Article has directed more daylight on a
private legal mechanism that is both extreme and not uncommon but
has received little examination by scholars and advocates of law
reform. The need to transform the public family regulation system is
acute, and it has understandably demanded the attention and energy of
child welfare practitioners and reformers. Reform of that system will
be incomplete, however, until privately initiated termination cases are
addressed as well. We fall short of protecting family bonds when we
do not acknowledge and examine the existence of laws that allow
those bonds to be severed under questionable circumstances, without
meaningful opportunities for rehabilitation and reunification, and
without other procedural protections. Another reason for the lack of
attention to these cases may be the fact that the persons who are the
targets of termination petitions are often not the most sympathetic
individuals, particularly in comparison with the petitioners
themselves, who are often members of intact blended families seeking
legal recognition and may be a custodial parent who has been
victimized by the parent whose rights they seek to terminate.
Nevertheless, it is due time to reconsider the extent to which the
continued endorsement—or at least tolerance—of the severing of a
parent-child relationship as a private remedy has a place in our civil
465. See Katherine Markey & Vivek Sankaran, Compassion: The Necessary
Foundation to Reunify Families Involved in the Foster Care System, 58 FAM. CT.
REV. 908, 909 (2020).
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justice system, what purposes that drastic legal action serves, and
whether those purposes can be better served without the destruction of
one of the most valued and valuable relationships recognized in the
law.

